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lI. INTRODUCTION
The only unique feature of nuclear reactor safety
differentiating it from the safety considerations found in any
heat producing plant is the fission chain reaction and its
radioactive products. The special safety measures taken in
Iuclear reactor safety result primarily from this unique feature.
The requirements of reactor safety are threefold.
First, the general public must be protected. Second, personnel
at the reactor must be protected. Third, the reactor plant
itself must be protecte1. The first and secind requirements are
of primary concern to the AEC as well as to the applicant. The
third requirement is of primary concern only to the applicant.
In order to assure the safety of the reactor a defense
in depth is set up. This defense in depth is evident in almost
every phase of reactor safety. First, every effort is made to
prevent an accident. Second, the consequences of an accident
are limited and contained by additional safeguards. The defense
in depth technique is nicely illustrated by the presence of a
minimum of three consecutive enveloping barriers to the release
of fission products--the fuel clad, the primary system tanks
and piping enclosures, and the outer building containment.
The prevention of a reactor accident can pe assured by
carefully controlling a number of independent or semi-independent
parameters. These parameters control the amount of heat produced
per unit time by the fission chain reaction (fission power level),
the amount of coolant (D 2 0 tank level), the flow of coolant to
remove the Aeat (D20 flow rate), the ultimate disposal of this
heat to the secondary system (D20 outlet temperature), the
2 .
amount of reactivity that can be added (step reactivity addition),
and any possible chemical reaction (D2 concentration). These
six parameters can control the production and removal of heat
from the reactor in such a manner as to insure that gross amounts
of fission products are not released by melting of the fuel
elements under any foreseeable circumstances. Manifestations of
all of them are measurable and each one can be controlled by
means independent of those used to control the others, except
in part the D20 outlet temperature .
It is conceivable that all of these parameters could
have been replaced by a single one--fuel element clad temperature--
but that one is not easily and reliably measurable. However,
that parameter is the basis of the limits set in those Technical
Specifications which follow and which involve prevention of fuel
element melting.
Consideration must be given to establishing a
consistent set of limiting safe values for the six parameters,
henceforth designated herein as the Primary Safety Parameters.
For purposes of these Specifications, the limiting safety values
will have the meanings shown in Fig. I-1 in which power has
arbitrarily been chosen as an example of a Primary Safety
Parameter to plot against percent of total -reactor operating
time spent at each power increment. In MIT's case the licensed
reactor power is 5 Mw(t). Therefore, a good operator will
endeavor to maintain the reactor as close to 5 Mw(t) as
possible. It is almost inevitable that occasionally the
operator will exceed the 5 Mw(t) level and this occasional
drift over the line is shown by the toe of the curve just
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to the right of 5 Mw(t). This occurrence may also result
from slight variations in instrument calibration or for
other reasons. At some level, set by MIT, alarms may sound
and, at a still higher level, a scram will occur.
Other levels need to be stipulated. One such level
is designated as the Limiting Operating Value (LOV). For
parameters which are amenable to safety systems and automatic
trips, this value will coincide with the Limiting Safety System
Setting (LSSS). If this level is exceeded, a report must be
prepared and reviewed by the MIT Reactor management, setting
forth the circumstances and stipulating any conclusions and
corrective action taken. Since this report is available for
AEC inspection it seems appropriate that this level constitute
the lower bound of the Safety Margin, the upper bound of which
is the Safety Limit. The AEC and the applicant are then in
agreement as to the extent of the Safety Margin and, further,
the AEC will have available to it information of any
occurrences in which the Safety Margin is encroached upon.*
As mentioned, the upper bound of the Safety Margin is set by a
Safety Limit beyond which it may be unsafe to venture without
seriously endangering the system or beyond which there is a
marked increase in the probability of an unsafe condition
developing. Beyond the Safety Limit is the region where
damage to fuel and release of fission products is quite likely.
One further set of parameter values must be
stipulated--the values used for setting the reactor conditions
to calculate the Safety Limits. These levels should be ones
*The LSSS for most parameters in most reactors will probably be
best located above scram levels, but for some parameters in some
reactors it may be safer or more convenient to reverse this order.
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that are seldom exceeded and then only by small amounts, and
they are here designated as the Operating Bounds, and they
are obviously the bounds in the direction of non-conservative
values. Conceivably, these values could be the nominal or
licensed levels, the operating scram points, or the LSS set-
tings. Often these three types of levels will be close together
and it will make little difference to the magnitude of the
Safety Margin which is chosen. The operating scram point will
be a more conservative choice than the licensed level, and the
LSS setting still more conservative. In this case, MIT has
designated the Operating Bounds for all Primary Safety Parame-
ters as the LSS settings. This is the most conservative
choice; but, as indicated above, other choices are possible
and may be logically selected with an ample margin of conser-
Vatism. The particular choice made by MIT simplifies the
Technical Specifications since it combines two different sets
of parameter values into one. Thus the alarm and operating
scram points remain undesignated in these Specifications, except
for the stipulation by MIT that these points will fall within
the operating band whose extreme limit is the LSS setting (now
defined to coincide with the Operating Bound level).
A maximum plate temperature of 450O0 C (84P0F) has been
chosen as the acceptable temperature limit for the calculation
of Safety Limits for the other measurable parameters. At
this temperature softening of the aluminum beings to be sig-
nificant, although actual melting does not begin until some-
what above 6000C (11120F). It is believed that this
6.
establishes an adequate Safety Limit well below the
point where melting at the hot spot would begin and some fission
products would be released. A "real" Safety Limit might be said
to exist at the hot spot melting temperature above 6000C.
In order to make a consistent, conservative, and
manageable set of Technical Specifications, the systems analysis
to determine appropriate Safety Limits is based upon two
important assumptions:
(1) Each of the Primary Safety Parameters is independent
and controllable by independent means.*
(2) Two independent Primary Safety Parameters will not
exceed simultaneously their respective Operating Bounds.
There are two justifications for these assumptions:
(1) By design of the process and safety systems and
procedures, two or more simultaneous failures or
malfunctions are required to produce significant
changes to two Primary Safety Parameters.
(2) The intent of management as evident by the operating
procedures is to maintain control of all parameters
within the LOV or LSSS.
This means that there must be a misoperation or equipment
failure affecting each of two independent parameters* followed
by a failure of the monitoring system for each parameter to
provide appropriate information and to take corrective action
(usually a scram). Thus there must be at least four simulta-
neous malfunctions or misoperations to invalidate the primary
assumptions of these Specifications. The only known important
interaction between the Primary Safety Parameters is produced
by loss of electrical power which produces an automatic
shutdown and, hence, a safer condition.
*The tank outlet D 0 temperature at power is an exception. It
was chosen as a Primary Safety Parameter to limit the
secondary coolant system conditions, but it also is dependent
on the primary systei power and flow. For the purpose of
this discussion it m:ight almost be considered a secondary
parameter monitoring the primary system flow and power and
providing additional and independent means of taking
correction action for those parameters.
For example, to set a Safety Limit for power, a steady-
state reactor was assumed with the flow rate, the reactor D20
outlet temperature, the D2 0 tank level, respectively, just
at its Limiting Safety System Setting. Then,
in order to establish a Safety Limit on power, it was imagined
that all power level safety circuitry was inoperative as power
was raised -slowly until a calculated power was reached where
either the hot spot temperature was calculated to be 450 0C or
where conservative predictions indicated an unstable or burnout
condition. The lowest power level leading to either of these.
conditions was chosen as the Safety Limit on power. If doubt
existed concerning the validity of information in regard to a
certain performance region or calculational method, that
method or region was excluded. Thus the analysis was always
carried out in a conservative manner.
The situation is similar for other important
parameters. For instance, the calculation to set the flow
Safety Limit was made with the power, the D20 tank level,
the core D2 0 outlet temperature, and the D concentration
assumed each to be just at its Operating Bound as the flow was
decreased until a plate temperature of 450 0 was reached or
until an instability was reached. This flow rate was
designated as the Safety Limit. Note that the flow Safety
Limit and the others are equally as important as the power
Safety Limit, and all must be treated in a similar manner if
a scientificaly meaningful set of Technical Specifications
is to result.
7.
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The consideration involving core symmetry was found
necessary for the analysis and, therefore, must be a license
condition. It is likely that some condition with the same
objective will be necessary in other reactors since otherwise
asymmetric fuel loadings, small fuel loadings, or asymmetric
control rod configurations could lead to localized heat fluxes
or heat removal problems much more severe than those
envisioned in the calculations. This condition specified in a
conservative manner the general nature of the core used in
the calculations. In the case of the MITR, this amounted to
specifying at powers above 200 kw a core of at least 19 elements
controlled by rods banked within 4 in. of one another and
fueled with elements of a plate type with a specified acceptable
clad thickness, a minimum average void coefficient, and a
negative overall temperature coefficient.
These Technical Specifications have been written to
incorporate in the "Specifications" themselves and the
definitions all requirements which MIT believes are necessary
and sufficient to assure the safety of the MIT Reactor. The
"Bases" presented with the Specifications set forth the logic
and reasoning behind the choice of the Specification in
question. They also indicate to the extent possible the
uncertainty in the values selected for limits. It is the
intent of MIT to present these Bases solely as a backup for
the Specification itself--to provide the technical arguments
for the Specification chosen. No statement made in any
Basis should be construed as a limiting requirement within the
license. Once the set of Technical Specifications has been
9.
approved, the Bases should not longer be a part of the continuing
dialogue between MIT and the AEC unless the logic and reasoning
used in the Bases are found by either party to be incorrect and
nonconservative.
10
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Primary Safety Parameters (Reactor)
The following controllable independent variables (except
for tank outlet D20 temperature at power) are designated
as "Primary Safety Parameters":
Reactor Primary System Power (neutron flux)
Primary Coolant (D2 0) Volume Flow Rate
Tank Outlet D 0 Temperature at Power (Limits secondary
coolant ondition, but also depends on power and
flow)
Step Reactivity Addition
Tank Level (D20) with Reactor Critical
Deuterium Gas Concentration
The several operational conditions of the reactor system
mentioned in these Specifications are defined in terms of
these variables and Safety Limits are determined in terms
of them.
B. Secondary Safety Parameters (Reactor)
The following variables are designated as "Secondary
Safety Parameters":
Reactor Period (neutron flux)
Containment External-Internal AP
Effluent Air Radiation Levels
Effluent Liquid Waste Radiation Levels
Reactor Room Radiation Levels
Equipment Room Radiation Levels
Exceeding certain operating limits of these Secondary
Safety Parameters will result in a scram or other safety
11.
action followed by a formal review of the cause of the
occurrence. However, no limiting value of these parame-
ters are considered as Safety Limits in the sense defined
under F below. Many of these parameters provide informa-
tion and require safety actions at appropriate levels.-to
insure compliance with AEC regulations 10CFR20 and 10CFR100.
C. Normal Operating Levels
The range of parameter values within which the system
normally operates. The normal operating points for all
parameters fall within this range and are quite well-
designated and closely followed--for instance, the licensed
power level is such a point. The limit of the normal
operating range in a nonconservative direction for a
Primary Safety Parameter is an operating scram level.
Operating scram levels must be equally conservative or
more conservative than Limiting Safety System Settings,
but they are not deemed to be a part of these Technical
Specifications and are not contained herein.
D. Operating Bound Limit (OBL)
A bound in the nonconservative direction which sets the
other Primary Safety Parameter values to be used as the
reactor conditions for calculation of the Safety Limit
for one Primary Safety Parameter. (In the MITR these
are the same as the LSSS below.)
E. Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS)
Settings for automatic protective devices related to the
Primary Safety Parameters which are so chosen that
12
automatic protective action will correct the most
severe abnormal situation anticipated hefore a Safety
Limit is exceeded.. If the automatic s.afety system does
not function as required, appropriate corrective-action
shall be taken and an audit of the abnormal. occurrence
shall be made by the reactor management. The Commission
shall be notified by means of a written report available
in the MIT Reactor records, recording the results of the
review and corrective action taken and the reasons
therefore.
For purposes of these specifications only, the LSSS is
defined to coincide with the OBL.
F. Limiting Operating Value (LOV)
Certain parameters, while sufficiently important to be
considered Primary Safety Parameters, are not amenable
to the concept of System Settings and automatic trips.
Protection of the Safety Limits on these variables must
be provided by operational control. The Limiting Opera-
ting Value is the Primary Safety Parameter value of
these certain parameters which, if exceeded, will
result in appropriate corrective action and an audit
of the abnormal occurrence by the Reactor management.
A written report shall be made describing the occurrence,
giving the results of the review, and stating any correc-
tive action taken and the reasons therefore.
The LOV is defined to coincide with the LSSS of Primary
Safety Parameters which can be protected by automatic
safety systems.
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G. Safety Limit
A limit set for a given parameter beyond which it may
be unsafe to venture without seriously endangering, the
system or beyond which there. is a markedi. ncrease-in
the probability of an unsafe condition developing,. The
values selected are based on experiments or conserva-
tive calculations and are, in general, more conservative
than the true or ultimate safety limits. In cases where
incomplete information exists these limits are set
conservatively. The Safety Limits for the Primary Safety
Parameters are set so as to insure that gross fuel melt-
ing will not occur within the Safety Limit.
H. In terms of the definitions above, the Primary Safety
Parameters shall have the following values:
Primary Safety
Parameter-
Power
Coolant Flow
Tank Outlet Temp-
erature at Power
Tank Level
Limiting Safety
System Setting
6 Mw
(2.6 MW)*
1800 gpm
(750 gpm)*
580C
Limiting
Value
6 Mw
(2.6 Mw)*
1800 gpm
(750 gpm)*
58 0C
Safety
Limit
8 Mw
(3.5 Mw)*
1350 gpm
(600 gpm)*
690C
5 in. below 5 in. below 18 in. below
overflow pipe overflow pipe overflow pipe
Conceivable Reac- --- 2% 2.8%
tivity Charge
D2 Concentration --- 4% 6%
in Helium
*Bracketed figures represent levels for 2 Mw operation with
only one coolant loop in operation.
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H. Normal Reactor Shutdown
The reactor is said to be shut down normally if the following
conditions exist:
a) All shim control rods in.
b) Primary coolant system on either normal or shutdown flow.
c) Reactor power at levels set by (y,n) interactions.
d) Reactor tank level either at overflow level or at
dump level,.
e) Primary outlet coolant temperature given by (T)< 530 C.
I. Maximum Security
The reactor facility is said to be in a condition of maximum
security if the following conditions exist:
a) All shim control rods in and magnets run, down.
b) Ventilation fans off.
c) Quick operating ventilation dampers and back-up dampers
closed.
d) Reactor tank D20 level at or above' dump level or fuel
under emergency cooling provisions,
e) City make-up water supply to the cooling tower off and
lines to City sewer system closed. Cooling tower fans
and sprays off with water flowing only into the basin.
f) H20 City emergency supply checked to assure availabil-
ity and connected by emergency connection to D20 system.
g) The containment area and its immediate environs posi-
tively secured.
h) Only personnel authorized by the supervisor in charge
within the restricted area.
i) In event Specification 111.6 is exceeded without conse-
quential effects, it shall be permissible to omit
conditions (b) and (c) above.
J. Review and Approve
The terminology "shall review and approve" is to be inter-
preted as requiring that the reviewing group or person
shall carry out a review of the matter in question and may
then either approve or disapprove it. Before it can be
implemented, the matter in question must receive an
approval from the reviewing group or person.
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III. SAFETY LIMITS WITH LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS
OR LIMITING OPERATING VALUES
These conditions assure that fuel plates will not melt
and that no other serious harm which could affect the
health and safety of operators or the general public
will come to the reactor.
16.
III.l. MAXIMUM STEADY STATE POWER LEVEL
Applicability
This, specification applies to the steady state thermal reac-
tor power level.
Objective
To ensure that the temperature of the hottest fuel plate
will not exceed 4500c (8420F).
Specification
The Safety Limit for the steady state thermal reactor power
level shall be 8 Mw. (The Safety Limit for one-loop operation
shall be 3.5 Mw.) The Limiting Safety System setting shall be 6 Mw.
(The Limiting Safety'System Setting for one-loop operation shall
be 2.6 Mw.)
Bases
Although aluminum melts at approximately 65000 (12000F), it
begins to soften significantly at about 4500C (8420F) and this
temperature is therefore a suitable criterion for guaranteeing
the structural integrity of the fuel elements.
Since the MITR operates at atmospheric pressure and since
the fuel elements incorporate thin aluminum fuel plates, simple
calculations show that the difference of about 3500C between
4500C (8420F) and boiling could not be reached if boiling burn-
out is prevented. Due to the same reasons and the addi-
tional fact that the coolant flow path in the core is of
multichannel design, there exists the possibility that flow
instabilities could occur before reaching burnout
lIt is possible that for the conditions present in a core of
this type the usual model for predictin* burnout ("departure
from nucleate boiling" or "film boiling ) does not apply
and that the heat flux could be pushed even higher before
reaching the limiting temperature.
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limitations. If flow instability does occur first, it would
have the effect of lowering the burnout heat flux to some
extent, but the exact amount is at the present time very
difficult to predict. In view of this difficulty, it is
assumed here that the onset of flow instability causes a
lower flow rate in one channel for the same pressure drop and
thus causes burnout at a lower heat flux than would be
computed from the average flow conditions of the channels.
It should be noted that this is a conservative assumption
based on the limitations of the present state of the art.
This fact combined with the conservative assumptions used in
predicting the onset of flow instability produces a safety
limit of the maximum steady state thermal reactor power that
is considerably below values based on applicable burnout
correlations. Thus there appears to be a comfortable margin
beyond this safety limit before reaching the point where a
real threat to fuel element integrity exists.
The method of investigating the onset of flow
instability consists of calculating the pressure drop as a
function of flow rate for a given heat flux. The minimum
stable flow rate is that which coincides with the minimum of
the curve. This is consistent with the stability criterion
below:
For instability:
(AP external syst.) - (AP coolant channel)>,O . (1)
Since, for a large number of channels,
AP ext. syst. = constant ,
the criterion reduces to:
6
- aw- (AP coolant channel)-0 . (2)
This theoretical model has been proposed in several references,
(1), (2), and (3), and has recently been found to give
excellent agreement with experiment (3).
In the case of the MITR fuel element some interpreta-
tion is necessary in order to define the coolant channel. The
entire fuel element could be considered a coolant channel,
since there are 19 to 30 elements in the core and the
assumption of a constant pressure drop across the fuel elements
is not significantly affected by flow changes in any one
element. The alternative is to treat the individual channels
between fuel plates of which there are 17 per standard element,
and less for reduced plate elements. This distinction has
considerable bearing on the results and as will be seen below
the latter case is the more conservative and has therefore
been used in this analysis.
The pressure drop across the coolant channel can be
divided into four parts:
(1) the entrance effect
(2) the friction factor drop along the length of
the channel
(3) the exit effect
(4) the gravity drop--since the flow is vertical
and upward.
In the absence of boiling, these pressure drops are normally
computed by standard methods and, except for the last one
which is independent of flow rate, are an increasing function
of flow rate, i.e., the slope of the pressure drop vs. flow
19.
curve is positive and there is no flow instability. The
presence of boiling in the channel affects all except possibly
the first factor. In general, the entrance effect and the
exit effect are increasing functions of flow rate, but their
magnitudes may be decreased by the transition to two-phase
flow. The friction drop may have either a positive or
negative slope and may be considered the determining factor.
Having defined the coolant channels as the individual
channels between fuel plates, the entrance effect becomes both
small and difficult to calculate due to the geometry of the
MITR fuel element lower adapter. For these reasons this
pressure drop has been neglected, introducing a conservative
factor.2 Since this term would be relatively large and have
a positive slope with respect to flow rate for the case of an
entire element considered as a coolant channel, the selection
of the individual fuel plate channels as the coolant channels
is quite conservative.
The exit effect pressure drop is also negligible
for the individual channels, but would be significant for the
whole element. It has therefore also been neglected and, for
reasons similar to those given above, this represents another
conservative factor.
Similarly, the gravity drop becomes an increasing
function of flow rate for two-phase flow, but requires
knowledge of the void fraction which is extremely difficult
to predict. Neglecting this term then adds still another
conservative factor.
A relatively simple fuel element modification incorporating
orificing for the coolant channels could probably produce a
substantial improvement in stability by adding an entrance
effect pressure drop.
20.
The remaining term is the friction term, which for
the no-boiling case is normally computed by:
L V2 (3
APADB D2g
where: f = dimensionless friction factor;
L/D = dimensionless length to diameter ratio = 112;
V = velocity, ft./sec.;
g = conversion factor, 32.3 ft.-lb. force/lb.
mass sec. 2 ; and
APADB = pressure drop, ft. of coolant.
The friction factor f has recently been measured for
an MITR fuel element by L. R. Enstice (4), and over the flow
range of interest found to be a constant = 10-2. This pressure
drop is more complicated for the boiling case, however, and
must be modified accordingly. Dormer (.) has experimentally
measured this effect for small round tubes for subcooled
boiling over a wide range of parameters and found that the
data can be best correlated by plotting:
P/APADB vs. q/q
where: AP, APADB = pressure drops with and without boiling,
respectively;
= correction factor to be applied to the
APADB results of Eq. (3);
q = heat on surface of coolant channel;
qsat 7 heat that would produce saturated boiling
at the exit of the channel.
Dormer's results are plotted for various L/D ratios in
Fig. III.1-1. It can be seen from the data in Appendix A
that Dormer's data involve parameters that are reasonably
consistent with the case of interest. Probably the most
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questionable factor involving its use in the present case is
that the data were obtained for round tubes, while the coolant
channels of interest are narrow rectangular channels.
Griffith has stated (6), however, that the concept of a hydraulic
diameter is meaningful for this purpose, so that the use of the
data is justified.
If all other parameters are unchanged, a reduction
in flow will decrease q and thereby increase q/qsat, here-
after referred to as R. Referring to Fig. III.1-1, if R is
sufficiently large (for the prescribed L/D curve), AP/APADB is
an increasing function of R. This behavior may be interpreted
as a pressure drop vs. flow relationship with a negative slope
as opposed to the positive slope of Eq. (3). The flow rate at
which the product of APADB and AP/APADB is a minimum then
corresponds to the minimum stable flow rate for the prescribed
conditions as, for example, in Fig. 111.1-2.
The actual calculation of R used to enter
Fig. III.1-1 involves other system parameters, specifically:
reactor power, the power produced in the hottest plate of the
hottest fuel element, the D20 flow rate, and the D20 inlet
temperature. The D20 flow rate has been fixed at 1800 GPM,
the OBL value. The power produced in the hottest plate of
the hottest fuel element is obviously a function of power
and has been taken to be also a function of the number of
elements in the core. This is meaningful since for a given
reactor power the power per plate is decreased if the number
of fuel elements is increased. To be consistent, this
relationship has been taken to be equivalent to that
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established for the prevention of nucleate boiling at 6 Mw
with a D20 outlet temperature of 55 0C (7) then:
- 500(1.,25)" l_9 M. PT
PPMAX (16) ( ) 50 4)
-3 1 Q~O.8
PMAX = 7 .82 x 10- 3 (4a)
where: PPMAX= maximum power per hottest plate (Mw),
N = number of elements in the core, and
P = reactor thermal power (Mw).
This relationship is counterbalanced by the effect
of the decreased flow per coolant channel when the number of
fuel elements is increased and the total D20 flow rate is
kept constant at 1800 GPM. The net effect of the dependence
upon the number of elements is to make the 30-element core
(maximum number) the closest to instability and the final
calculations are based on this case. It should also be noted
that the use of Eq. (4) establishes hottest plate power
values which are considerably higher than those predicted
by Devoto (8), including hot channel factors, and are
therefore conservative in that sense.
Since reactor power is a variable parameter for
the purpose of this calculation, there remains only the
relationship with the D 0 inlet temperature. At a given time
the actual value of the D20 inlet temperature will be
determined by a number of factors, such as the outside wet
bulb temperature, the cooling tower effectiveness, the H20
flow rate, the overall heat exchanger heat transfer
coefficient, and the D20 flow rate. For a given power and
flow, however, there is a simple relationship between the
23.
inlet and outlet temperature, and since Eq. (4) gives the
hottest plate power as a function of reactor power, the ratio
R can be determined independent of the H20 system provided a
limiting D20 outlet temperature is established. This limiting
temperature for this calculation is 58 0 C, the 0BL value for
the D20 outlet temperature.
This leads to the following derivation for R:
T = WTCp(Tout - in)
= (2.915 x 10 4)WT(Tout ~ in) , (5)
where: PT = reactor thermal power, Mw;
WT = total D20 flow rate, GPM; and
Tout, Tin = D20 temperature, 0 C.
For WT = 1800 GPM and temperatures in 0F,
eT = 0.2914 (Tout - T ) (5a)
Now,
P sat = cCp(T sa T n (6)
where: Psat = power required to raise the bulk coolant
temperature in the hottest channel to
saturation,
W = D20 flow rate in the hottest channel, and
Tsat =-saturation temperature at channel exit.
The flow through an individual channel Wc is related to the
total flow, WT, through the number of elements in the core:
We * ='T (7)
Then, by analogy with Eq. (5a),
P 0 .2914 T
sat - 147N sat - Tin
1.714 x 10-2
= N (sat ~ in) . (6a )
Using Eq. (5a) to substitute for T. gives:
Ps 1714 10~ (Tsat + 3.42 P - TOut) . (6b)
Now, by definition,
R - q - (8)
qsat sat
7.82 x 10-3 9 0.8
1.714x lo, (8a)1.714 x 10~ (Tsat + 3 .43 PT Tout)
4.81 NO 2pT
(Tsat + 3 .4 3 PT Tout (8b)
Since the H20 saturation temperature is approximately
215*F for a pressure of 15.5 psia (local pressure at channel
exit), this is a conservative value for D2 0.
Taking Tsat = 215 0F, and N = 30,
= 9.494 PT (8c)
R = (2 15 + 3.4 3 P T
Eq. (8c) is the desired relationship.
It remains now to determine the value of R which corres-
ponds to a minimum stable flow condition. For constant power
and outlet temperature, R is inversely proportional to flow
2
and thus, from Eq. (3), APADB varies as 1/R . The pressur'e
drop with boiling, AP, is then proportional to the quantity
("P/APABD) 1/R 2 and the minimum value of this quantity will
coincide with conditions of minimum stable flow. Using the
data of Fig. 111.1-1, Fig. 111.1-2 was constructed which indi-
cates that a minimum stable flow condition occurs with a
value of R of about 0.72.
Using this value of R and Eq. (8c), the plot in
Fig. 111.1-3 is obtained. This indicates that stable
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conditions exist for a total flow of 1800 GPM provided operating
conditions correspond to a point below and to the left of the
line of Fig. III.1-3. As can be seen from the graph, the
Safety Limit of 8 Mw is consistent with the OBL value of 5800
for the D20 outlet temperature.
The conditions at 8 Mw must now be checked to ensure
that the flow instability does in fact occur prior to burnout.
References (Q) and (10) are among the most recent burnout
correlations which completely bracket the physical parameter
values for the MITR fuel element channels. Calculations are
given in Appendix A for the 8 Mw core which is summarized below:
Power - 8 Mw
No. Fuel Elements - 30
Total D20 Flow - 1800 GPM
Flow/Element - 60 GPM
Flow/Coolant Channel - 3.53 GPM
Maximum D2 0 Outlet Temperature - 5800 (1360 F)
Maximum D20 Inlet Temperature - 4300 (1090 F)
Power Produced in Hottest Plate - 43.4 kw
Average Heat Flux in Hottgat Plate -
1.70 x 105 Btu/hr. ft.
Axial Flux Ratio, Avg./Max. - 0.8118 (Ref. (11))
Maximum Heat Flux in Hottgst Plate -
2.90 x 10 Btu/hr. ft.
The results of the burnout correlation calculations are given
below:
2
Correlation Burnout Heat Flux (Btu/hr. ft.2)
Gambill (Q) 1.41 x 106
Macbeth (10) 1.6 x 106
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The two correlations are in good agreement and while it is not
clear whether the results should be compared with the average
or the maximum heat flux in the hottest plate, even the maximum
value is exceeded by a factor of about 5. It can be concluded,
therefore, that boiling burnout will not occur for the 8 Mw
core considered.
The Limiting Safety System (LSS) setting of 6 Mw is based
on calculations of that power which will just allow the plate
surface temperature at the hot spot to reach 1000C. In this
way, a very conservative limit has been established that pre-
cludes any possibility of boiling in the core. It should be
noted here that no credit has been taken for the film tempera-
ture drop. In addition, nucleate boiling in the core should
have no adverse effect and, in fact, it is reasonably certain
that the reactor could be raised to power well above 8 Mw
without encountering any serious adverse effects.
In addition, the 6 Mw level is far enough above the
5 Mw licensed power to permit the setting of power scram
levels at intermediate values between 5 Mw and 6 Mw, and yet
6 Mw is not so far away from 5 Mw as to significantly affect
the hypothetical accident conditions and fission product
releases calculated.
It should be pointed out that this choice of 6 Mw for
the LSSS and 8 Mw for the Safety Limit is somewhat arbitrary
and could be raised, for instance, by cutting into the
flexibility allowed here for future fuel element design.
The choice of any parameter Safety Limit or LSSS in the
case of flow, power, and Tout depends on its interaction with
27.
the other two. In particular, the choice of the 8 Mw Safety
Limit depends on the acceptable (LSSS) coolant outlet tempera-
ture, the acceptable (LSSS) coolant flow, and the maximum
acceptable power developed per fuel element plate. The
choices made of the limits are designed to correspond to. the
present well-verified operating conditions while still pro-
viding reasonably large margins between the Safety Limits
and the LSSS levels and providing sufficient flexibility in
core loading patterns and fuel designs.
APPENDIX A - Sample Calculations of Burnout Correlations
Gambill (9) gives the following correlation for the
burnout heat flux:
BO=- 1/4 1 + P 0.923 C AT 7Kga) p CvT
pv
+K'()NReN r w b Bo
(Al)
where: K, K' =
LV =
pv =
0~ =
C=
a
C, 
=
adjustable constants of boiling and convec-
tive terms;
latent heat of vaporization;
density of vapor;
surface tension;
conversion constant, L-M/F.9 2
local acceleration;
density difference (P, - p),
constant pressure specific heat of liquid;
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= density of liquid;
ATsub = degree of subcooling (tsatt b);
k = thermal conductivity of liquid;-
D = equivalent diameter of flow passage;
NRe = Reynold's number;
N = Prandtl number;
m,n = exponents;-and
tw - wall temperature at burnout.
This correlation is based on a physical model and the
first term corresponds to the boiling heat transfer at burnout
while the second term corresponds to non-boiling or convective
heat transfer at burnout. The use of .the second term requires
knowledge of tw ,the wall temperature at burnout, and the
method proposed for predicting (12) tw does not cover the
temperatures of interest for low pressure cases. This
apparently is a result of the fact that the convective term is
significant only for the higher pressures., In any event, this
term has been neglected in the present case, and any error so
introduced will be conservative.
Table 111.1-3 below gives the extreme ranges of some
of the physical parameters covered by the data correlated.
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Table 111.1-3 Rangie of Date (for rectangular
chanhels) for Ref. ( )
Paramie ter Range
Pressure (psia) 14-2,000
ATsub (OF) 0-282
v (ft./see.) 4.8-85.4
(Bo (Btu/hr.ft.2 xl0 6) 0.42-11.41
Table 111.1-4 below gives the values of the parameters
used in Eq. (Al).
Table 111.1-4 Parameters for Eq. (Al) for 8 Mw, Core
K = 0.14
=' - 58.85 dynes/cm. - 4.032 x 10-3 lb./ft.
a = go = 32.2 ft./sec.2 4.17 x 108 ft./hr .2
Lv = 890 Btu/lb.
p = 65.71 lb./ft. 3
ap = 65.67 lb./ft .3
pv = 4.04 x 10-2 lb./ft .3
Cp = 1.0 Btu/lb. 0F
De = 0.2124 in.
ATsub = 67.8 0F (at hot spot of hottest channel)
The results of Eq. (Al) give a burnout heat flux of 1.41 x 106
Btu/hr .ft 2
Macbeth (L0) has correlated a wide range of burnout
data using slightly different equations for round tubes and
rectangular channels.
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For round tubes:
; x 10-6
A + CD (Gx 10-1 6
I +CL
A = yOD 1 (G x 10-6) 2
C = y3D (G x 10 6 ) 5
= burnout heat flux, Btu/hr.ft.2
D = tube diameter, in.;
G = average mass velocity, lb./hr.ft. 2
Ah = subcooled enthalpy at channel inlet, Btu/lb.;
L = channel length, in.; and
Y0-* y5
- optimized parameters (functions of pressure,
flow, and geometry).
For rectangular channels:
3 x 106
A + 0 .555 CS (G x 10-6) Ah
1 -C (A 3)
where: A = yOS (G x 10-6 )2
C = y 3 S (G x 10-6 )5 , and
S = internal spacing between flat heating surface
rectangular channel, in.
Table 111.1-5 below gives the ranges of data
correlated.
Table 111.1-5 Range of Data3 Correlated in Ref. (11)
Channel
Round tubes
Parameter
Pressure (psia)
L (in.)
D (in.)
Range
15-2750
1-79
0.40-0.940
3For both tubes and rectangular channels, the "high velocity
regime" is the appropriate category. The "low velocity
regime" data is therefore not considered here.
where :
(A2)
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Table 111.1-5 (continued)
Channel Pramte Range
RondtuesG -i6  2Round tubes G x 10 (lb./hr.ft.2) 0.11-7.82
Ahi (Btu/lb.) 2-713
Rectangular channels Pressure (psia) 600-2000
L (in.) 6-27
S (in.) 0.050-0-101
G x 10- 6 (lb./hr.ft.2 ) o.1-4.78
Ah (BTU/lb) 12-654
The minimum pressure used in the rectangular channel data is
600 psia, and this raises some doubt as to the applicability
of the correlation 'or the core considered here. However,
Rohsenow (13) has proposed the following procedure for use
with no significant loss of accuracy:
(1) The round tube correlation is used for pressures
of 15 psia and 530 psia, using the appropriate h
values.
(2) A pressure correction factor, F , is obtained from
Step (1) above by dividing the R5 psia value by
the 530 psia value.
(3) The rectangular channel correlation is used with a
pressure of 600 psia and then multiplied by Fp.
The values used in Eqs. (A2) and (A3) are given in
Table 111.1-6:
Table 111.1-6 Parameters for Eqs. (A2) and (A3) for 8 Mw Core
D = 0.2124 in.
G = 0.964 x 106 lb./hr.ft .2
L = 24 in.
S = 0.111 in.
Ah = 120, 380, and 93 Btu/lb. (for 3 cases calculated)
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Table III.1-7gives the results of the three cases
calculated.
Table 111.1-7 Results of Eqs'. (A2) ahd (A3)' for' & M' Cb~e'
Round-15 psia Round-530 psia Rectangulat-600 psia,
y0
y1
y2 ,
y3
y4
y5
A
C
0x 10-6
1.12
-0.211
0.324
0.001
-1.05
1.5339
0.009033
1.307
The pressure correction factor is then:
yp 0 15 Psia, 1.307 X 106 = 0.8102
P 530 pra 1.613 x 100
and the corrected burnout heat flux is then:
#0 =O #600 psia Fp = (1.976 x 106)(0.8102)
= 1.60 x 106 Btu/hr.ft.2
1.57
-0.566
-0.329
0 .0127
-1.4
-0.737
3.82
0 .1145,
1.613
23.5
-0.472
-3.29
0.123
-1.4
-3.93
74.47
3 -0904
1.976
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III.2 MINIMUM D20 FLOW RATE
Applicability
This specification applies to the D20 flow rate.
Objective
To ensure that the temperature of the hottest fuel plate
will not exceed 450 0 (8420F).
Specification
The Safety Limit for the D20 flow rate shall be 1350 GPM
through the fuel elements. (The Safety Limit for one loop
operation shall be 600 GPM.) The Limiting Safety System setting
shall be 1800 gpm. (The Limiting Safety System setting for one
loop operation shall be 750 gpm.) This specification does not
apply to operation below 200 Kw.
Bases
Using the Operating Bound values for reactor power and D20
outlet temperature, 6 Mw and 580C, the minimum stable D20 flow
is 1350 GPM, using the same approach as in Section III.l. (In
a similar manner, 2.6 Mw and 580C gives a minimum stable flow
of 600 GPM.)
The Limiting Safety System setting of 1800 GPM for coolant
flow has been established, first, on the basis that flows in
excess of this value can be attained easily in normal operation.
Second, at flows less than this value and with a tank outlet
temperature of 580C there is a possibility of the onset of flow
instability at power levels greater than 8 Mw. As indicated in
Section III.1 the selection of OB levels and Safety Limits on
power, flow, and outlet D20 temperature are interrelated.
At power levels below 200 Kw, coolant flow is not necessary.
(See Bases of Section IV.3).
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III.3. MAXIMUM D20 OUTLET TEMPERATURE
Appli abilit
This specification applies to the D20 outlet temperature.
Objective
To ensure that the temperature of the hottest fuel plate
will not exceed 450 0c (8420F).
Specification
The reactor shall not be critical with the D2 0 outlet
temperature greater than 690C. The Limiting Safety System
setting shall be 58 0C0.
Bases
By using the Operating Bound levels for reactor power
and D20 flow rate, 6 Mw and 1800 GPM, the minimum stable flow
condition is found when the D2 0 outlet temperature is raised
to 69O0. The calculations leading to these values utilize
the methods of Section III.1. The results are shown in Fig.
III.1-3 of Section III l.
The Limiting Safety System setting of 580C for the D20
core outlet temperature has been established, first, on the
basis that values of the outlet temperatures of 35-50 C
depending upon cooling tower conditions are those normally
observed in the operation of this system and, hence, 5800
would be sufficiently above normal to make an audit of the
situation fruitful. Second, the choice of this value permits
the establishment of satisfactory limits for power, coolant
flow, and fuel element design.
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III.4. MAXIMUM SAFE STEP REACTIVITY ADDITION
Applicability
This specification applies to step reactivity additions.
Objective
To ensure that the surface temperature of the hottest fuel
plate will not exceed 450 0C during any credible reactivity
excursion.
Specification
The maximum amount of reactivity that may be added in a
stepwise manner by the credible failure or malfunction of any
experiment or component or any set of circumstances which could
credibly couple two or more components or experiments in such a
manner shall not exceed 2.8% in reactivity. The Limiting
Operating Value shall be 2%.
Bases
Technical Bases
The present "Maximum Credible Accident" to the MITR is
defined in the 5 MW Report (7) as the sudden insertion of a
160-gram element into the central position of a just critical
core which would add 2.8% reactivity.
The subsequent formation of steam voids in the core
will shut the reactor down before melting occurs in the fuel
elements. The maximum fuel plate temperature was estimated
to be about 3000C by using the approach outlined in Ref. (14),
based on experiments conducted on H20-moderated cores in the
Borax and Spert programs.
Since that report, transient experiments have been
conducted on D2 0-moderated cores as part of the Spert
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program (15,16,17). Two D20 cores differing in neutron lifetime
and void coefficient were investigated. In both cases the fuel
element design and enrichment were quite similar to that of the
MITR element with the Spert element having more closely spaced
fuel plates. The pertinent nuclear properties for the cores
are given below.
SPERT MITR
Close Packed Expanded
/p 0.064 sec. 0.10 sec. 0.17 sec. (Ref. (18))
Cv 255 mp/liter 200 mp/liter 214 mp/liter (Ref. (19))
where: R = neutron lifetime,
delayed neutron fraction including photoneutrons
(0.75% p in MITR), and
Cv = average void coefficient.
It was found that the two Spert cores exhibited the
same transient behavior for a given period as seen in Fig.
111.4-1 (16) over the range investigated with no coolant flow.
On extension of the expanded core measurements to shorter
periods the experiment shows a rapid rise in maximum temperature
at a reciprocal period of about 18 sec.- - which is assumed to
be due to departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the surface
of the plates. Unfortunately, the departure from nucleate
boiling (DNB) was not observed in the close packed core during
the "no flow tests" because they were not extended to
sufficiently short periods. It is concluded that the curve
shown in Fig. 111.4-1 will apply to the MITR up to the DNB
point since the Spert cores were found to agree over a range
of lifetimes and void coefficients.
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Some estimate of the behavior of the MITR past the
DNB point may be made by considering the following Spert data:
(1) In an H20-moderated core with / = 8.16 x 10~ sec.,
melting was observed with a 5-msec. period (20).
(2) From the curve shown in Fig. III.4-1, melting in
the expanded D 0 core may be estimated to occur at
about a 30-mse. transient.
Since the neutron lifetime for the MITR is longer
than either of these cores, it is expected that melting would
occur at a somewhat longer period. A linear extrapolation of
period versus /O predicts melting of the MITR plates at about
a 50-msec. period. By extrapolation of the expanded core data
in Fig. 111.4-1 a plate temperature of 45000 would be reached
at a = 28 sec~ 1 and if the reciprocal period is increased by
4 sec~l the melting temperature (6600C) is estimated to occur.
Assuming a similar relationship for the MITR, with a 20 sec~
predicted reciprocal period for melting to occur, then 45000
would be reached when a = 16 sec~ which corresponds to about
a 62-5-msec. period and an insertion of 3.7 P or 2.8% 6k/k in
reactivity.
During the Spert excursions on the expanded core,
the pressure at time of maximum power and the maximum pressure
attained sometime later were measured. With a = 16.1 sec~ ,
(which could be obtained with a 2.8% insertion into the MITR)
the Spert reactor produced pressures of 5.5 and 24 psig,
respectively. These pressures are well within the MITR design
pressure of 40 psig.
It is then concluded that even a 2.8% reactivity
insertion into the MITR with no flow would not endanger the
integrity of the fuel elements.
The effect of flow on the temperatures attained is
shown in Fig. 111.4-2 (__) for experiments conducted on the
close packed core. No flow tests were conducted on the
expanded core. It is seen that the maximum temperature
attained is about the same for both flow and non-flow cases,
but the post-peak behavior is significantly different. The
average power level and frequency of oscillations increase
with increasing flow. This effect led to fuel element melting
about 3 sec. after initiation of the period at rather low
reactivity insertions in the Spert compact core.
The MITR is protected from such instabilities by
automatic instrument scrams actuated by period and neutron
power levels. The period scram would occur very shortly
after the initiation of the transient while the level scrams
would actuate when the neutron level had reached the scram
level of 6 Mw. From Fig. 111.4-2 it is seen that a response
time of 1.5 sec. (as specified in Specification v.4) would
be sufficient to prevent secondary oscillations.
The Limiting Operating Value of 2% in reactivity
is based on establishing an adequate Safety Margin below
the Safety Limit of 2.8%. In particular, a
study of the Spert II data would seem to indicate that a
transient involving the stepwise addition of 2% in reactivity
could be accommodated safely under flow conditions of 6 to
7 ft./sec. including the flow-power instability oscillation
effect observed at Spert II following the initial transient.
Thus, on the basis of the Spert tests, even in case the reactor
were to fail to scram within 1.5 sec. as it should, the
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transient and the subsequent oscillation should not result in
core damage.
The safety margin of 0.8% Ak is sufficient to accommodate even
the total withdrawal of the regulating rod within this margin.
The rod is the only one utilizing automatic control. While
it should be thrown out of automatic control by the electronic
circuitry, it is conceivable that it might not. The maximum
reactivity controllable by the regulating rod has been set at
0.75% (equal to P in this reactor). Normally its worth is
approximately 0.6%. It does not appear credible that there
would be any interaction between a change in reactivity caused
by an experiment and the operation of this regulating rod so
as to cause it to drive out. (The drive is a rack and pinion
system with a withdrawal rate of less than 1.0 in./sec.
corresponding to a reactivity effect of 2 x 10~ 4k/k/sec.)
In addition, the regulating rod is normally operated in its
mid range. The slow rate of withdrawal, the total worth of
the regulating rod, and the incredibility of an interaction
all indicate the conservatism of the margin from the viewpoint
of the operation of the regulating rod.
Assessment of Calculations
The calculations of the plate temperature attained
on step reactivity insertions is limited primarily by
predicition of behavior above the DNB point. The method
outlined above is consistent with the few cases where this
phenomenon was observed. Future measurements and/or
theoretical interpretation may improve the technical bases
of this specification.
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The effect of void coefficient on the maximum
temperature appears to be quite weak. The two D2 cores
studied at Spert which differed somewhat in void coefficient
exhibited almost identical behavior. Using a correlation of
H20 results (20) (which is applicable to D20 cores if
experimental pressures are used), the effect of decreasing
the void coefficient to 150 ms/liter increases the predicted
temperature at 2.8 6k/k by about 250C if no steam blanketing
occurs. It is then concluded that a variation of 25% in the
MITR void coefficient would not affect this specification.
Therefore, 170 mp/liter is chosen as a conservative lower
limit for void coefficient.
In the expanded D20 core with R/P = 0.1, a
temperature of 45000 on the plates would be reached with
a = 28 sec~1 which corresponds to an insertion of 3.8 P or
2.9% 6k/k. The permissible reactivity insertion therefore
does not appear to vary significantly with variations in
neutron lifetimes typical of these D20 cores.
I I I 1 1 1 1 1 | I I I I 1 1 1 11 I I I I I I II
600
500-
- MELTING RANGE OF 6061 ALUMINUM ALLOY -
-EXPANDED CORE, ATMOSPHERIC (15)
o CLOSE-PACKED CORE, ATMOSPHERIC(16)
u
0
a_
w
a-
w
Hi
w-
()
3001-
200 -
0
o.A
100 1-
I I I I I iiil
10~' I
RECIPROCAL
I I I I 11111 I I I I I I i f
10
PERIOD (sec-1)
FIGURE II. 4-1 MAXIMUM FUEL
TEMPERATURE
PLATE SURFACE
AS A FUNCTION OF
RECIPROCAL PERIOD. (16)
Lii
400-
0
102
-I -1 1 - - ' ' I ' ' I ' .I
45.
I I I I I III I I I I I -I I I I I I I I L .
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
TIME (SEC)
FIGURE II. 4-2 REACTOR POWER AND REACTIVITY COMPENSATION
AS FUNCTIONS OF TIME FOR SPERT II IOO-msec-
PERIOD TRANSIENTS WITH DIFFERENT FLOW RATES.(17)
1000
500
200
100
0
0
Hr
50
20
10
46.
III.5 D20 TANK LEVEL WITH REACTOR CRITICAL
Applicability
This specification applies to the level of D2 0 in the
reactor core tank which is permissible with the reactor critical.
Objective
To ensure that the temperature of the hottest fuel plate
will not exceed 4500C (8420F) and to assure protection
against loss of coolant.
Specification
The reactor shall not be made critical with the level of
the heavy water in the main reactor tank lower than 18.0 in.
below the overflow pipe level. The Limiting Safety System
Setting shall be 5 inches below the overflow pipe.
Bases
If the reactor were to be made critical with little or
no upper heavy water reflector, a sudden addition of more
heavy water would lead to a large increase in reactivity.
Hence, some limits must be placed upon a minimum upper reflec-
tor height.
Consideration of the safety limit for a maximum
reactivity step addition (111.4) showed that a stepwise
addition of 2.8% in reactivity could be tolerated without
exceeding safe fuel plate temperatures. On this basis, a
correlation can be made with past experiments conducted at
the MITR which leads to the establishment of a safe heavy
water level in the reactor vessel.
Experiments carried out by J. Lewins and C. Larson
(Ref. (18)) during the startup of the MIT Reactor provide
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sufficient information to set this minimum allowable height.
Reactivity worth of the top reflector was determined in a
series of measurements on a clean core with varied shim height,
a uniformly poisoned core, and a non-uniformly poisoned core.
The latter two cores were designed to represent operating
cores and other experiments have shown that they closely
approximate the data. Table 111.5-1 from p. 101 of the thesis
report by C. Larson is reproduced here. This indicates quite
clearly that a reactivity loss by lowering the level from
overflow pipe level to 77.9 cm. (125.6 - 77.9 = 47.7 cm. loss
in height) results in a loss of reactivity of 3880 ms. In
this reactor, P is worth 0.75% reactivity and, therefore,
the loss of D20 height to 80 cm. is clearly conservative for
a Safety Limit. This is 45.5 cm. or 18.0 in. below the normal
level. The estimated errors shown in the table, based on
agreement of different sets of measurements and their
repeatability, indicate that the accuracy is sufficient to
assure the conservatism of the 18.0 in. figure.
The lower Limiting Safety System Setting of 5 in. below
the overflow pipe is purely arbitrary and based on the fact
that there is a tank level scram 14 in. below the overflow
pipe level. It could as well be 8 in. since little reactivity
change will occur by that time.
The level indicators on the tank ensure that if the
levels drop below the set points safety actions including
reactor scramswill follow. Thus, a loss of coolant through a
pipe rupture will be detected early and measures can be put
into effect to minimize the consequences.
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Table 111-5-1 Reactivity Worth of Top Reflector by Critical
Measurements
(a) Clean core, shim height varied
lev (cm.) 125.6 103.3 93.0 82.1
Reactivity (mb) 0 -261 + 5 -692 + 14 -2760 + 54
(b) Uniformly poisoned core
Heavy water
le.v1 (cme) 125.6 88.3 77.9 70.7
Reactivity (mp) 0 -1290 + 24 -3880 +80 -7240 160
(c) Non-uniformly poisoned core
levl (cm) 125.6 118.8 89.4 80.8 76.8
Reactivity (me) 0 -53 3 -10 -84 -150
+ 2o + 60 +90
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111.6. Dn CONCENTRATION LIMIT
Applicability
This specification applies to the D gas concentration
in the helium gas cover blanket over the .D20 in the primary
system.
Objective
To prevent a flammable concentration of D2 gas in
the helium blanket.
Specification
The D2 concentration in the helium blanket shall not
exceed 6 volume percent. The Limiting Operating Value shall be 4
Bases
Recombination of the dissociated D2 and 02 is
accomplished by continuously circulating the helium from above
the reactor core through a catalytic recombiner. The flow
through the recombiner is held at approximately two cubic
feet per minute, and the recombiner operates at a temperature
above seventy degrees centigrade as measured at the middle of
the reaction chamber.
In a thesis by John Nils Hanson, "Efficiency Study
of the MITR Catalytic Recombiner, " (22) it is shown that the
recombination efficiency of the recombiner is 100% at 2 Mw
and Will be 100% at 5 Mw. In the experiments at 2 Mw, the
recombiner was shut off for varying times up to 2 1/2 hours.
The largest concentration of D2 during these experiments was
found to be 1.448%.
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In a report, "Flammability of Deuterium in Oxygen-
Helium Mixtures," issued by the Explosives Research Center of
the Bureau of Mines (23), it is shown that the volume percent
of D2 needed for flammability is independent of the volume
percent of 02 from 4 to 30 percent 02. The data in this
report give the flammable concentration of D2 at 2500 as
7.8 volume percent and 7.5 volume percent at 800C. Extrapolation
of these two points by a straight line approximation indicates
a flammable concentration of 6.87 volume percent at a temperature
of 2000C. These results are conservative since ignition in the
tests was initiated at the base of the combustion tube.
The maximum temperature in the helium system will be
less than 2000C under all foreseeable circumstances; so it can
be concluded that combustion will not occur if the D2
concentration is kept less than 6 volume percent.
The same report shows that even with deuterium-air
mixtures of 30% D2 plus 70% air the peak pressure reached in a
mixture ignited in a 2-ft. sphere at 250C at one atmosphere
initial pressure was approximately 83 psig. This would seem
to indicate that even in event of combustion of concentrations
of deuterium far beyond that envisioned the pressures reached
are not sufficiently high to rupture the primary containment
in the region Cf the reactor vessel or major piping. This
statement, while not amenable to direct proof', appears well-
supported since the 2-ft.-diameter sphere represents a larger
wall-to-wall distance than any vital section of the primary
system. The most likely region for failure is the D20 storage
tank located in the basement. A rupture disk is located on
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this tank and even the total loss of this tank by an excessive
pressure would not seriously harm the rest of the system.
Therefore, it is concluded that this parameter, even in the
extreme, may not pose a safety limit of any sort; although
proof is not available.
The design pressure of the system is 40 psig,
utilizing ASME Unfired Pressure Vessel conditions. Pressure
surges of the order of twice design pressure are well within
the capabilities which the system can withstand.
The accuracy of the experiments described in Ref.
(23) is best indicated by a brief discussion of the data.
All experimental mixtures which were flammable for the 8000
initial temperature tests were within 0.3-0.5 volume percent
above the 7.5% deuterium mixture limit and those which were
not flammable were within a similar band below the limit.
Similar results are reported for the 250C experiments. Thus,
the set of experiments was carried out in such a way as to
define quite accurately the limits of the region of
flammability as a function of volume percent deuterium gas
with from 60 to 90% helium present and the balance oxygen.
The experiments were carried out at pressures of 0.5, 1.0,
and 2.0 atmospheres and appear to be independent of pressure
within that region. Since these experiments cover exactly
the range of conditions and gaseous mixtures of interest here,
they should be completely applicable.
The Limiting Operating Value for deuterium
concentration in the helium cover gas was established at 4%
primarily in order to provide a reasonable margin below
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the Safety Limit. In addition, it was necessary to set it
high enough to ensure that too frequent audits were not
necessary.
53.
IV. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
These conditions assure that Safety Limits are being
properly observed, that vital equipment functions
correctly, and that the reactor will operate in a safe
condition.
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IV.1. EMERGENCY COOLING REQUIREMENTS'
Applicability
This specification applies to the emergency cooling
system including the emergency cooling tank, valves, piping,
transfer pumps, standby transfer pump, and fuel element spray
heads.
Objective
To ensure that sufficient time is available for
taking additional steps to cool the fuel elements subsequent
to a loss of D20 from the main reactor tank.
Spec if icat ion
The emergency cooling tank shall be capable of
providing for operation at power levels above 1 Mw a minimum
of 20 minutes of emergency cooling flow over the fuel elements
with a minimum total flow rate of 4.5 gal./min.
Bases
As is shown below, a total flow rate of 4.5 gal./min.
from the D2 0 emergency cooling system is more than adequate to
remove the decay heat of the hottest fuel element immediately
following the loss of D20 from the core tank. This assumes
the reactor has scrammed, either from the low level tank scram,
or from the loss of over 13 p associated with the loss of the
moderator. Since the decay heat is a decreasing function with
time, this flow rate is also more than adequate for cooling
the core for times longer than 20 minutes. (The capacity of
the emergency cooling tank is 175 gallons.)
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1. Cooling of total core. Consider first the
ability of the present emergency coolant to remove the decay
heat from the core. Allow this coolant to completely
evaporate. Assuming that the initial temperature in the
coolant tank is 25 0C, then the enthalpy change from liquid
water to saturated steam is 404 x 103 kg-cal.
The decay heat, P, from fissions of U235 is given
(24) as a fraction of the operating power, P0 , as:
= 6.22 x 10-2 (t0.2 - (T+t)-0.2
P0
where: t = decay time (sec.), and
T = irradiation time (sec.).
During a period '- after shutdown the total heat
produced is:
Q 6.22 x 10- 2P (t-0.2 - (T+t)0 .2 )dt
0
-2 0"P. 8 0.8 08
= 7.78 x 10-P 0 8 (T+) + T )Mw-sec.
If, to be conservative, the irradiation time is taken to be infin-
ite, then for '7 = 20 min. Q is 27.1 x 10 3 kg-cal. when P is 5 Mw.
0
Thus the capacity of the emergency coolant is more
than adequate.
2. Cooling of center element. The decay heat of an
individual element will depend on the operating power of that
element. The less elements in the core the higher the
individual element power must be. Also, the power generated
in the element must be increased by heating from the gamma
rays produced in surrounding elements.
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Let F be the energy production rate for gamma's and7
F be the production rate for beta's in a fuel rod.
(1) Based on calculations made at Harwell (25) for
similar fuel elements, we assume that lu% of
the beta production is absorbed in the element
and 12% of the gamma's.
(2) Assume production rates are equal, as is stated
on pp. 7-15 of Ref. (24).
FY = F = F.
The total energy production in an element is then:
2F = P , and F = .
The total energy absorbed from the energy produced
within the element is:
F + 0.12 FY = 1.12 F = 1.12 P = 0.56 P
The rest of the energy,0.44 Pescapes to surrounding
elements.
(3) If the surrounding elements are assumed to produce
equal power and are considered line sources, then
the power reaching the central element from a
neighboring element is 0.44 P (3/r) where r is in
inches (l/r variation for line sources).
(4) Finally, assume 25% of the incident gamma radiation
is absorbed. Then a surrounding element contributes
0.25 x 0.44 P (3/r) = 0.11 (3/r) to the energy
absorbed in an element. Considering all the elements
surrounding the central element, then P a, the total
absorbed energy,
N 3
Pa = 0.56 P + 0.11 P r -
or
N 3
P = MP = (0.56 + 0.1 -)pa Y 
- r11i
where Ni is the number of elements in the ring.
For a 19-element core
My = 0.56 + 0.11 (2.82 + 2.72)
= 1.17
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and for a 24-element core
Mf = 0.56 + 0.11 (2.82 + 2.72 + 0.864)
= 1.26
In the 5 Mw Report (7), a 19-element core was
considered with element power limited to 500 kw from reactivity
considerations. Taking the burnup of this element to be
55 MWD (which is the maximum burnup to present), the heat
absorption one second after shutdown including gamma ray
absorption will be 484 kg-cal./min.
The flow rate through this element during the 20
min. of emergency cooling will be 152 gals./min. = 1.742
kg/min. Allowing this water to change to saturated steam
would remove 1063 kg-cal./min., more than is being generated
in the element.
There are two methods of providing this cooling
after the 20 min. of emergency cooling have expired, both
utilizing the emergency cooling tank. In the first method
the transfer pump (backed up by the standby transfer pump
in case of electrical failure or other failures of the
transfer pump) is used to supply D20 to the emergency cooling
tank. Suction can be taken from any part of the D2 0 system
or from the floor of the equipment room if the spillage has
occurred there. In the second method light water is supplied
to the emergency cooling tank from a city water supply
through a quick-connect fitting. This second method is thus
independent of any conceivable D20 system failure causing
loss of coolant from the core tank.
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Since both methods involve relatively simple
procedures and since either ensures a readily available
adequate source of decay heat coolant, a 20-min. supply of
emergency cooling water provides adequate protection to the
core for this eventuality.
Since it has been shown on p. 692 of Ref . (26)
that metal conduction to structural members combined with
natural convective gas cooling is adequate for removing
decay heat at power levels below 1 Mw, this specification
applies only for power levels in excess of this amount.
The calculations in (24) and (25) provide adequate
allowances for error and for spray variability within the
element. No allowance has been taken for conduction of heat
into the fuel element side plates and end boxes and thence
into other structural members which p. 692 of Ref. (26)
indicates is an important factor. No allowance is made for
convective heat loss by gas or steam circulation. Omission
of these factors is conservative.
IV.2. BUILDING CONTAINMENT AIR LEAK RATE
Applicability
This specification applies to the reactor building
containment air leakage.
Objective
To ensure against the release of airborne radio-
active effluent from the building in quantities endangering
the general public in event of any accident within the
building.
Specification
The air leak rate of the building containment shall
be less than 2 percent of the containment air volume per day
at 2 psig over-pressure when the ventilation dampers are
closed. Full containment will be a requirement to permit
reactor startup. An interlock shall be provided to assure
that rods can only be withdrawn if no major containment leaks
exist.,
Bases
The possibility of the release of fission products
from fuel elements has been discussed in the January 1956
MIT "Final Hazards Report," Appendix C; the October 7, 1960,
(27) "Two Megawatt Report," Addendum to Appendix C (28); and
the November 5, 1963, "Five Megawatt Report," changes to
Appendix C. The conclusion reached is that the fission
product release due to a fuel meltdown is an incredible
accident.
As a justification for the leak rate specification
of less than 2 percent of the containment volume per day at
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2 psig over-pressure, a new evaluation has been made of the
maximum exposure that could occur in the incredible event of
fuel melt and fission product release.
Two mechanisms for the incredible accident which
might melt fuel can be imagined:
(1) A sudden insertion of reactivity of such a large
amount that the inherent shutdown mechanism of the
void coefficient will not prevent fuel element
meltdown.
(2) A sudden loss of all D 0 in the core during operation
at 5 Mw with the emergency cooling system found
inoperative in any form so that it will not prevent
fuel melt due to fission product decay heating.
In the first case, the limitations on reactivity
available in the core preclude the possibility of the
reactivity insertion causing fuel meltdown. In the second
case, only if the pipe from the emergency cooling tank were
suddenly plugged or sheared at the time of the D20 loss could
the emergency cooling system be made inoperative. Even if
the emergency cooling system were inoperative, it is not
clear that the connecting aluminum adaptors will not conduct
enough heat away from the elements to reduce the peak of the
slowly rising temperatures even in the hottest element below
the melting point of aluminum. Since both of these
accidents are believed to be incredible and the second
accident might not lead to fission product release, the first
accident is assumed, therefore, to give a more conservative
(largest) estimate of the largest concentration of fission
products in the atmosphere of the containment shell.
The calculations presented in the 12/26/57 Addendum
to Appendix B and C of the Hazards Report (MIT-5007) (27), as
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submitted to the AEC, shows that under very conservative
assumptions the maximum possible exposure to radiation in one
hour due to leakage of fission products out of the containment
shell at the maximum permissible leak rate will be less than
1750 rem to the thyroid, 6.85 R total external p dose, and
0.6 mr gamma dose, after operation of the reactor at 1 Mw
and complete fuel melting. Conservative, but more realistic,
assumptions can be made which will reduce the magnitude of
these calculated values.
First, experience with reactivity transients which
lead to fuel melting would indicate that the core will not
be completely melted. In the results of the SL-1 release,
p. 680 of Ref. (26), it was found that 40% of the fission
product inventory was involved in the melted fuel and,
further, only 5 to 10% of the total fission product inventory
escaped from the vessel. Thus it will be assumed that only
40% of the total fission product inventory is contained in
the melted fuel plates, rather than 100% as used previously.
It should be noted that the effects of after-heat in the MITR
are much smaller than those in most power reactor cores
being considered today and, therefore, the SL-1 experience is
quite comparable to the hypothesized incredible accident being
considered here. In addition, the fuel type is similar.
Second, the operating cylce of the MIT Reactor
consists of approximately 100 hours of continuous operation
and then a shutdown for the remainder of the week. Therefore,
the Il31 concentration does not reach the saturated
equilibrium value, "A ". At the end of a long series of00
weekly 107-hr . irradiations the Il31 activity is 0.7 AM or
70% of the saturated activity.
Third, in order for any of the building contents to
escape, it is necessary for the pressure inside the building
to rise above atmospheric pressure. Neither of the two
accidents discussed above will lead directly to a significant
building pressure rise. The reactor core is operated at a
few inches of water pressure above atmospheric pressure, and
a rupture of the reactor vessel will not release a large
amount of energy to the atmosphere in the containment, in
contrast to a large energy stored in a pressurized power
reactor. Therefore, the possible increase in building
pressure can only come from changes in the external atmos-
pheric pressure after the containment is sealed. In the
previous calculation it was assumed that a differential
pressure of 1 psi above atmospheric could occur. However,
such large changes in differential pressure have only been
recorded in rare cases and occur over long time periods (more
than a day). Since the exposure is calculated at the closest
point which will be evacuated in a short time, it is
reasonable to consider only short period changes in
atmospheric pressure. According to the Boston Weather Bureau,
a thunderstorm nose creates the shortest time pressure
variations. The most marked example of such a pressure change
since 1872 through 1946 occurred on June 8, 1946, when the
pressure rose 0.19 in. of Hg, and then dropped 0.24 in. of Hg
in a period of 1 1/2 hours. If the building had been sealed,
the vacuum breakers would have opened during the pressure
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rise and the differential pressure would have risen to 0.24 in.
of Hg during the atmospheric pressure drop. This occurrence
and similar pressure drops recorded at the MITR indicate that
such decreases are approximately linear with time. The average
pressure differential for the worst case would then be about
half maximum or 0.12 in. ,of Hg. It is then conservative to
assume a maximum average differential pressure of 0.16 in. of
Hg during the 1-hour exposure time.
The combination of these three items leads to a
factor of:
( x(&)xx (.05) = 45.7,
Fraction Cycle Short time
of core operation pressure
melt rise
by which the previous calculation of the thyroid dose should
be reduced. (Note that the previous calculated dose was
reported in units of rep with a conversion factor of 100
ergs/gm which is now designated as Rad, Rem = RBE x rad.
However, for this case, RBE = 1.0 according to NBS Handbook
69. Hence, the previous value of 1750 is taken to be rem.)
After operation of the reactor at 5 Mw the
calculated dose in the incredible event of a reactivity
excursion leading to the release of fission products due to
fuel elements melting and to the exposure at the boundary of
the exclusion area to the maximum permissible leakage becomes:
D =51750) =91 rem,
to the thyroid due to Il31. Even if the reactor were to be
operated on a continuous 24 hour a day schedule, the dose
would not be greater than:
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D 1 = 273 rem .
The external dose to a person standing in the leakage
cloud due to beta or y radiation from the cloud is calculated by
assuming a continuous operation of the reactor for 180 days at
5 Mw prior to the fuel melting, and the above assumption
concerning the fraction of the core melted and atmospheric
pressure rise. By using the previous calculations, the external
p dose becomes:
D 5 1.07 rad in 1 hr.;
and the 7 dose from the cloud at the maximum dose point becomes:
D = 550)565) = 0.09 mrad in 1 hr.
Summary. The dosage to critical organs from inhalation
of all other radioactive fission products is much less than from
iodine. It is concluded, therefore, that the gas-tight building
surrounding the MIT Reactor provides adequate protection to
persons outside the building against exposure due to fission
products or inhalation of fission products even if fuel elements
of the reactor should melt, an accident considered to be itself
incredible.
An interlock must be satisfied requiring a minimum
0.10 in. water pressure differential (negative) in the building
before a reactor startup can be conducted. This condition
ensures that the building containment is not grossly violated
at the time of startup. This same system shall provide a
continuing alarm, if during operation the pressure differential
is not satisfied.
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IV.3. REACTOR CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION
A plicab ility
This specification applies to that instrumentation
necessary for reactor control.
Obje tive
To insure that the operator has sufficient
indication of power level, neutron flux level, D20 flow,
reactor tank level, and reactor outlet temperature.
Specification
A. The reactor shall not be brought critical or operated
unless the following instrumentation is in operation:
(1) 2 neutron level channels
(2) 1 period channel
(3) Main reactor tank D20 level indicator.
B. The reactor will not be operated above 200 kw unless
there is indication of the following parameters in
addition:
(1) Reactor D20 outlet temperature
(2) Main D20 flow.
C. Emergency power to operate the instruments indicated
under IV.3-Al,A2,A3, and Bl above and also those
specified under IV.4 shall be made available for at
least one hour following a loss of normal power to the
facility.
Bases
The neutron level channels and period channel
provide indications of power level and change in power
level during the approach to criticality and at low power
levels. These instruments are therefore required at all power
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levels including subcritical operation. At power levels above
200 kw there is an additional need for flow and outlet
temperature information to insure that the system is being
operated within Operating Bound levels.
In practice, low power physics tests are usually
done between 2 kw and 8 kw. To establish 200 kw as an upper
limit for this type of operation, the calculated temperature
rise as a function of time in the main tank with no main D20
flow is shown below.
200kw x 3414 Btu 0 hr.
1b(D20) E '45 0 /min.
9.16 gal x 475 gal
Using this temperature rise and an intial temperature of 250C,
it would require approximately 50 min. for bulk boiling to be
reached. Since this mode of operation will be used only for
low power physics tests, the 50 min. provides ample time for
observations and subsequent shutdown.
As the temperature of the coolant is raised from
2500 to 1000C, the existing negative temperature coefficient
will result in somewhat over 3.5 P in negative reactivity
being added. Since no reactivity changes during low power
physics tests will exceed a small fraction of p, the tempera-
ture of the bulk D20 will rise only a few degrees before a
low equilibrium power level is established. Thus, even in the
event no shutdown occurs, the reactor is self-protecting.
At all times the MITR has present in the core
valving which permits a convective flow within the primary
tank in the event of loss of flow. This valving would permit
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convective flow in the less than 200 kw operation. In addition,
work at Harwell (30) has shown that convective flow is induced
within a core similar to the MITR core even if no such valving
exists.
While the use of emergency power is probably not
required in this reactor since loss of power automatically
scrams the reactor and since coolant will still cover the core
and melting will not ensue, none the less, the knowledge
supplied to the operator that the reactor is properly secured
and protected will insure an orderly procedure in all such
cases. The choice of a minimum of one hour is based on
providing reactor information during the period following
scram and far enough beyond the emergency cooling cycle
operation to insure that the core is receiving adequate
subsequent cooling.
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IV.4 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS AND REQUIRED RADIATION MONITORS
Applicability
This specification applies to the levels of radio-
active effluents released from the reactor sit.e and specifies
the radiation monitors needed to prevent release of radiation
above these levels.
Objective
To ensure that operation of the MITR does not subject
the public or MIT personnel to amounts of radiation above that
allowed by 10CFR20.
Specification
1. The release of radioactive effluents from the reactor site
will comply with all the provisions of Part 20, Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations with the following exemptions:
a) A dilution factor of 3000 shall be applicable to the
concentrations of gaseous effluents released from the
stack.
b) The gross quantity of tritium activity released to the
sanitary sewer system shall not exceed 200 curies per
year. All other radioactive material released to the
sanitary sewer system shall not exceed one curie
concentration.
2. During periods when ventilation is exhausted to the environ-
ment, a radiation monitor, which indicates in the control
room, shall be operable and capable. of detecting particu-
late and gaseous activity in the ventilation exhaust
stream and of automatically closing the building vents.
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Monthly checks will be made to ensure that the tritium
concentration as the water vapor in the stack gaseous
release is below the levels indicated in._(la) -above.
3. A secondary system water monitor, which indicates in the
control room, will be in operation whenever secondary
cooling water is being circulated between the reactor
building basement and the cooling towers. Sampling of
this water for tritium content will be carried out at
least once every 24 hours during those periods when the
reactor is in normal operation with the main H20 or
D2 0 pumps running.
4. At least one floor monitor capable of warning personnel
on thereactor floor shall be in operation when the
building is occupied.
Bases
Stack Gas Effluent Dilution Factor Basis:
The basic equations presented below were derived at
MIT by D. Lanning and presented to the AEC April 24, 1959, as
part of documentation backing up the MIT application for
Amendment 3 of License R-37. (31) They were independently
derived and presented by Hawkins and Nonhebel (32) and Moses,
Strom and Carson (33).
The maximum ground level concentration from a point
source at a height, h, above the ground as given by Sutton's
formulation (34) is:
X 2Q 1 az (1)max _re )y
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where Q = the discharge rate from the stack, (curies sec ')
i = average wind speed (meters sec~ )
5-Z and <ry = Gaussian standard deviations of the plume distribution.
The effective increase in stack height, AH, due to the
discharge rate from the stack should be included. According to
Holland, this is given by:
Ah = B (2)
u
where B = l.5V d + (4x10-5 )Qh
V5 = velocity of the stack effluent (meters sec~ )
d = stack diameter
Qh = stack heat emission rate (cal sec )
Moses, Strom and Carson (33) provide evidence that
the Holland formula is conservative.
Substitution of equation (2) in equation (1) gives:
Xms 2Qc6z 1 (3)
'reas = 5y (h + )
u
Differentiating X with respect to a and setting Xm /ii = 0
will give a maximum for X when a = B
Hawkins and Nonhebel (32) call this value of ii the
"critical wind speed."
Substituting this value of 5 in equation (3) gives
(X) Q CrZl (4)max Imax = ore 7M
This concentration value is a double maximum representing a
maximum with respect to horizontal distance from the source
and the maximum with respect to wind speed. Further Q = X F
where X0 (curies/meter2 ) is the concentration at the top of
the stack and F (meters/sec ) is the flow rate from the stack.
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The stack effluent is normally not heated so Qh in equation (2)
is negligible. Equation (4) may now be written in terms of a
concentration ratio
(Xmax)max F 1 z F a-z
X 0 max max 2re h(1.5V d)<y = 3rehVs doy
But, by definition, V5 = 4F/7rd 2 Therefore:
(R d a-z
max max - 12eh oy
To compute (R m)max for the MITR one has
h = 50 ft., the vertical height between the top of the stack
(150 ft. above ground) and the highest occupied level in
neighboring buildings
d = 1.5 ft., the diameter of the stack at the top
= 1.0 conservatively
(R ) 15 1
max max = 12(272)50 lObO
A study of the wind rose in the Cambridge area shows
that the maximum time average concentration ratio will occur
at a point east of the stack. The wind is in that quadrant no
more than 30% of the time.
Therefore, it is clear that the time average concen-
tration ratio will be substantially less than
0.3 x 1 1
The annual average concentration in the vicinity of
the stack will be less than this value for the following
reasons:
a) because the wind velocity changes in magnitude the
downwind point of maximum concentration is not
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fixed as to distance from the stack as is implied
by the equation.
b) in general the stack velocities and the Rmax values
will be such that the average wind-speeds at the site
will usually be higher than that value-calculated to
give the maximum concentration.
c) /c y is always less than unity in reality
d) the stack height above neighboring buildings in
almost all directions and certainly to the east is
greater than the 50 ft. value used.
In recent years there have been erected at MIT two
buildings higher than the MITR stack. A third is planned.
It is of interest, therefore, to calculate a minimum
dilution factor from the stack to these "tall" buildings.
The total dilution factor "D" for the effluent air
between its origin at the stack top and the location considered
is the product.
D = Dt D eDd D g
where Dt is due to decay in time of the radioactive effluent,
D is due to air entrainment in the plume as it leaves
the stack at high velocity,
Dd is due to diffusion of the plume due to action of
the wind,
D is due to variable direction of the wind.g
The quantity Dt is calculated from the known half
life of the radioactive isotope and the time it takes for the
wind to move the effluent from the stack to the point in
question.
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The quantity De is
Morton (35) and Scorer (36).
and the observed half angles
obtained by the methods of
They utilize conservation laws
of the plume to show that:
(1)
o e
where V0 is the vertical speed of the effluent air at the
stack orifice (22.9 m/sec),
V is the vertical speed of the effluent air at some
distance beyond the stack outlet,
2
r e is the radius of the plume of area A = rr e at the
same distance from the stack outlet,
r 0 is the radius of the stack orifice of area A =
ro 2 (0.75 ft. = 0.229 meters).
Applying the conservation equation to the effluent
gas gives
AoVopo = AV (2)
where po and p are the density of the gas at the stack orifice
and at the point where the velocity is V.
The entrainment dilution factor using equations (1)
and (2) becomes
2
PO AV e ro re
De AV = 2r= F
00 0 e
This relation is considered to hold until the verti-
cal velocity equals the wind velocity. (and the plume radius
is re) Then diffusion is assumed to start.
The quantity Dd can most easily be calculated by
considering the ratio of the cross section of the plume at
the beginning of the diffusion period and at the time it
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reaches the point in question. The work is simplified if the
plume is considered to be diluted only in the horizontal
plane. This is a conservative assumption.
If the plume horizontal width is equal to S at
the building distance d, from the stack, then:
D S
Dd 2r
e
The quantity D is calculated by considering it as
the product of two terms, Dw, the dilution due to the fraction
of the time the wind blows in the given octant, and Dr, the
ratio of the arc length of the octant to the horizontal diffu-
sion dimension S at the location considered a distance d from
the stack.
S D= D D 2rdg w r Zw-7
Combining these equations
D=D D D D = Dt ( )( )( g2d)Dw = Dt D 7d
o e o
If the residual stack velocity remains greater than
the wind velocity, Dd becomes unity, and S becomes 2r e The
result is numerically the same.
The three buildings and the results are:
Direction Distance D
from stack from stack w D
Earth Science Bldg. E 590 (meters) 3.3 3,340 Dt
Eastgate E 1035 3.3 5,860 Dt
Married Student SW 190 12 3,910 D,
Housing (Future) I.,
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Thus, even if radioactive decay is neglected the average dilu-
tion factor to the nearest building -will- be greater than 3000.
These calculations also indicate. that addition of several
additional high buildings should-not cause any substantial
change in these conclusions.
Tritium Factor Basis:
Leaks in the D20 - H20 heat exchanger systems result-
ing in discharge of tritiated water to the sanitary sewer sys-
tem has always been considered a possibility at the MITR. It
is believed that tritium discharged into the sewer at concen-
trations equal to or less than that provided by 10CFR20 presents
no undue health hazard to the general public.
The average discharge of water from the secondary H20
system of the reactor to the public environment per year is
approximately 6 x 10 liters. Of this, approximately 107
liters is discharged as blowdown to the public sanitary sewer
after dilution with an approximately equal volume of water
coming from the Nuclear Engineering Building. The sewage from
the site after further large dilutions by MIT and other users
of this sewer goes into an MDC trunk sewer and is discharged
at Deer Island to the ocean. The remainder of 5 x 107 liters
is evaporated from the cooling tower.
Paragraph 20.106 of Part 20 of Title 10 CFR states
in part:
(a) A licensee shall not possess, use, or transfer
licensed material so as to release to an unrestric-
ted area radioactive material in concentrations
which exceed the limits specified in Appendix "B".
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Table II of this part, except as authorized pursuant
to 20.302 or paragraph (b) of this section. For
purposes of this section,. concentrations may be
averaged over a period not greater than. one year.
(b) An application for a license or amendment may include
proposed limits higher than those specified in para-
graph (a) of this section. The Commission will
approve the proposed limits if the applicant demon-
strates:
(1) That the applicant has made a reasonable effort to
minimize the radioactivity contained in effluents
to unrestricted areas; and
(2) That it is not likely that radioactive material
discharged in the effluent would result in the expo-
sure of an individual to concentrations of radioactive
material in air or water exceeding the limits speci-
fied in Appendix "B", Table II of this part.
Any air release of tritium from the secondary water
system falls under these paragraphs. The MPC for tritium in
this case from Appendix B, Table II Column 1 is 2 x 10 pc/ml
of air.
Further P. 20-303 states in part:
No licensee shall discharge licensed material into
a sanitary sewerage system unless:
(a) It is readily soluble or dispersible in water; and
(b) The quantity of any licensed or other radioactive
material released into the system by the licensee
in any one day does not exceed the larger of
subparagraphs (1) or (2) of this paragraph:
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(1) The quantity which, if diluted by the average
daily quantity of sewage released into the sewer
by the licensee, will result in an average con-
centration equal to the limits specified in
Appendix B, Table I Column 2 of this part; or
(2) Ten times the quantity of such material specified
in Appendix C of this part (10 x 250 pc).
The release to the sanitary sewer of blowdown water
from the secondary water system falls under these paragraphs.
The MPC for tritium in this case from Appendix B, Table I
Column 2 is 1 x 10-1 Rc/ml of water.
Consider first the case of evaporation in the cool-
ing tower. The chief meterologist of the Boston office of the
U.S. Weather Bureau has provided MIT with approximate average
monthly dew points for four reporting times daily for the past
sixteen years. From these numbers, the annual average water
vapor present in the Boston air is ^'-5.7 x 10-3 gms-H 20/gm
of air or ~6.8 x 10-6 ml H2 0/ml air. If one assumes that
this water vapor is entirely due to evaporation of water con-
taining tritium into average humidity air at the MPC of 20 x
10~8 pLc/ml air, then the water must have had a concentration
of approximately 20 x 10-8/6.8 x 10-6 = 3 x 10-8 curies/ml
H2 0. Since approximately 5 x 10 10 ml H20/year are discharged
from the site via air release, this would permit the discharge
of 5 x 1010 ml/year x 3 x 10-8 curies/ml = 1500 curies/year
without on the average exceeding acceptable concentration
levels.
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The situation is more-complex -than indicated here
since the air at average humidity-which enters the cooling
tower will on the average have only undetectable amounts of
tritium. It will leave the cooling tower with more water
vapor per unit air volume than when it entered and may even be
saturated. It will mix with other air and return to the
general average humidity. In no case will the water vapor in
the air be composed entirely of water evaporated from the
cooling tower. The above calculation should therefore be
quite conservative except, perhaps, in the region very close
to the cooling tower.
Consider now the discharge to the sewers. On the
average 1010 ml of blowdown water are discharged annually.
If this is discharged at the MPC levels for sewers of 1 x 10~
pc/ml including credit for the factor of 2 dilution which
occurs at the reactor site (but no credit from other MIT
installations feeding the same sewer) the total amount of
tritium that could be discharged would be:
2 x 1010 ml x 1 x 107 curies/ml = 2000 curies/year.
By means of careful surveillance of the D20 level in
the primary system and by sampling daily during normal opera-
tion when the main D20 and H20 pumps are on, every effort
will be made to detect heat exchanger leaks early. On the
other hand the variability in tritium analysis counting
accuracy and other factors will even under the best conditions
permit some tritium to escape before-it is detected;
With these considerations in mind, a value of 1/10 MPC
or 200 curies/year for the sewer discharge has been selected as
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the maximum total tritium discharge in event of heat exchanger
leaks. The escape of tritium, with the surveillance methods
described above being used, should be readily .observable before
this quantity is exceeded. It also results in a maximum average
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concentration in the discharge sewer water of 2 x 10~ curies/ml
in the water which is well under the 3, x 10-8 curies/ml of H20
required to ensure that the air concentration of tritium in
the water vapor discharged from the cooling tower will be
under the allowed values on the average.
Monitor Basis:
A negative pressure of 0.2 in. of H20 is maintained
in the MITR containment shell so that any air leakage at fittings
will be into the containment shell. All ventilation enters
and exits through ventilation headers. Both the inlet and out-
let headers are fitted with filters, "Butterfly" dampers,
emergency dampers, and fans. The monitors located in the ven-
tilation exhaust main header are used to supply trip signals to
seal the building and prevent the escape of radioactive efflu-
ents. The monitors located in the exhaust stack are to deter-
mine whether any high level release has actually 'taken place,
and could also serve as backup monitors for building ventila-
tion trips.
The plenum gaseous monitor is primarily used for
detecting radioactive gaseous effluents but will detect high
levels of particulate activity., The particulate monitor will
detect radioactive gaseous effluents such as Argon 41 with a
decreased efficiency. Thus, if the gaseous monitor is not
operating or being repaired, the trip point on the particulate
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monitor can be lowered to provide adequate protection. Two
monitors in the ventilation exhaust stack back up one another
and, hence, adequate protection will still be present if one
monitor should fail.
The secondary water monitor surveys th.e light water
which passes through the cooling towers for the presence of
radiation. It cannot detect tritium, but would detect the
presence of N16 which would accompany any significant leakage
of heavy water through the heat exchanger tubes into the light
water during power operations. Therefore, it would immediately
indicate a large D20-H20 leak and the system would be shut down
and isolated. If a D20-H2 0 leak were to occur but be of such
minor magnitude so as not to be detected by the water monitor,
the periodic light water samples which are analyzed for tritium
would indicate that a leak existed and the system could be
isolated before excessive concentrations of tritium had developed
in the system. During shutdown operations with the main D20
and H20 pumps off, for instance over weekends, the development
of large leaks is unlikely and the main heat exchangers are
isolated, thus ensuring a very small pressure difference even
if a break should occur. The radioactive level in the H20
would be very low in the event of a leak, but the background
is also lower and Na24 in the leakage D20 might still permit
detection of the leak by the light water monitor which detects
gamma rays.
At least one operating floor monitor is needed to
insure that the general radiation levels- in the occupied area
around the reactor are within the limiting values established
by 10CFR20.
IV.5. VARIABLE EXCESS REACTIVITY AND SHUTDOWN MARGIN
Applicability
This specification establishes the permissible variable
excess reactivity and the required control rod worths.
Objective
To enable the reactor to be adequately shut down
under all conditions.
Specification
1. Five shim rods shall be in operating condition and the main
reactor tank at overflow before bringing the reactor to a
critical condition.
2. The total variable excess reactivity above cold Xe free
critical shall be less than the worth of the four least
reactive shim rods.
3. An absorbing element shall be removed from the core for
maintenance only if the core shall be left subcritical
by at least the worth of the most reactive remaining shim
rod.
4. The reactivity worth of the regulating rod connected to
the automatic control system shall be less than 0.75% 6k/k.
5. The reactivity worth of the limited dump of the top reflector
shall be greater than the reactivity effect of the most
reactive shim rod.
Definitions
1. The "cold Xenon free critical" MIT reactor is defined as
a critical configuration in which:
(a) The average D 20 temperature in the core is 100C.
(b) No fission product Xenon exists in the reactor.
(c) The reactor is loaded for the beginning of an operating
period.
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(d) Variable reactivity effects such as sample changes
which occur during normal operation shall be in the
state in which they have the maximum positive reactivity.
2. Variable reactivity refers to the changes which may occur or
vary during operation. It will include Xenon, fuel burnup
(for one or more operating cycles), sample changes made in
operation, changes in experiments during operation, etc.
Bases
Limiting the total excess reactivity to less than the
worth of the four least reactive shim rods and with only five
rods operating allows one rod to fail to drop while still
completely shutting the reactor down.
Due to Xenon buildup after shutdown from equilibrium
conditions, at least one more rod could be held up temporarily
(up to 32 hrs at 5 Mw) and still hold the reactor subcritical.
In the six years of operation of the MITR, no rod
has failed to drop on a scram signal. It is then considered
unlikely that at least four rods out of five would not be
inserted. In normal operation, six control rods would be in
operation and only four rods out of six would have to drop.
The specification on removal of an absorbing element
provides that the stuck rod criterion will always be met, even
when one rod is removed for repair. Thus the reactor still
would not go critical on the removal of a second element.
Since the movement of the regulating rod is governed
by the automatic control system, a possibility exists of its
accidental withdrawal. Its worth is therefore made a part of
this Technical Specification. Although it is not deemed
credible, the entire limiting worth of this regulating rod
added to the reactivity worth allowed at the Limiting Operating Value
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(that amount which might be added by the credible failure or
malfunction of any experiment or component or any set of cir-
cumstances which could credibly couple two or more components
or experiments) still would not exceed the Safety Limit of 2.8%.
As indicated on the basis of Specification 111.4 an addition
of 2.8% would not endanger the integrity of the fuel elements.
As a further precaution, at least an additional shim rod
worth would be available from the limited dump of the D20
reflector. This provides at least the equivalent of the stuck
rod criterion safety margin in a completely independent back-up
shutdown method.
As a general philosophical basis, the following stuck
rod criterion is complied with at this reactor: "It should be
impossible for a reactor to be made critical in its most reac-
tive situation on the withdrawal of a single rod. Conversely,
it should always be possible to shut down the reactor with one
rod stuck in its outermost position. If it is possible that
rods or mechanisms might interact so that several could be
stuck in the out position, then the number of rods included in
the stuck rod criterion should be increased accordingly."
(26, p. 677)
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iv 6 FUEL ELEMENT HANDLIN AND STORAGE'
Applicabilit
This specification applies to the operations of
storing and handling fuel elements.
Objective
To ensure that fuel elements will be handled at all
times in a manner to protect the health and safety of the
reactor personnel involved and the public and to safeguard
the elements.
Specification
1. Fresh fuel elements shall be stored in any of the
following locations:
(a) In the reactor.
(b) Within the dry storage holes on the reactor top.
(c) In two approved storage vaults in the building
adjacent to the containment building.
(d) Temporarily in rooms or sealed-off areas which
can be locked for storage during experiments
involving fuel.
2. Irradiated fuel element assemblies shall be stored in
any of the following locations:
(a) In the reactor.
(b) In the dry storage holes on the reactor top.
(c) In the fuel storage tank in the basement of the
reactor building.
(d) In the fuel element transfer flask or other
proper shield within the controlled area.
3. Handling of fuel elements:
Only one fuel element at a time shall be moved in or
out of the reactor core. Not more than six of the
MITR fuel elements shall be outside of the storage
areas as designated in Items la,b,c and 2ab,c, except
85.
during the processes of receiving or shipping fuel from
the site in approved containers. Records of fuel
element transfers shall be maintained. Prior to trans-
fering irradiated fuel from the reactor vessel to the
transfer flask, the reactor shall have been shut down
from power operation above 200 kw for a minimum period
of twelve hours.
Bases
The principal problem in regard to fresh fuel elements
is that of accidental criticality. The locations specified in
la,b,c and 2ab,c provide for complete criticality control.
The reactor itself is of course shielded and appropriate
written procedures assure that it is loaded properly. The
dry storage holes in the reactor top are separate pipes poured
in the concrete shielding and thus are isolated from one
another neutronically. The fresh fuel storage vault and the
spent fuel storage pit both have carefully designed geometric
arrays to assure that criticality will not occur. The
specification of no more than six elements outside of the
designated storage areas of la,b,c and 2a,b,c assures that
no criticality will occur elsewhere.
The chief additional problems with spent fuel are
those of shielding personnel from the emitted fission
product gamma rays and preventing melting from after-heat.
The shielding requirement is met by utilizing a shielded
transfer flask for movements and temporary storage and more
permanent shielding as indicated in 2a,b,c,d. The require-
ment to prevent melting is met by specifying that 12 hours
elapse between reactor shutdown and removal of the element
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from the core. Harwell (25) has shown by experiment that an
element very similar to that used in the MITR and operated at
a power of 500 kw/element will reach a maximum plate.
temperature of ,-,4500 C if removed into non-circulating dry
storage after 5 hours incore cooling and 360 C after 12 hours
incore cooling. Since the 500 kw element corresponds to the
highest power element conceivable in the MITR at 5 Mw(t) this
is deemed to provide sufficient conservatism.
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IV.7 LIMITING CORE OPERATING CONDITIONS
Applicabilit
This specification applies to core conditions during
operation of the MITR at power levels above 200 kw,
Objective
To ensure that the core is operated in a manner consistent
with the assumptions used to evaluate the Safety Limits.
Specification
In addition to items stated elsewhere in the specifications:
1. The reactor shall not be brought critical unless all fuel
elements and components such as thimbles, etc. are locked in
position and all openings through the lower top shield plug
sealed.
2. The reactor shall not be operated at power levels greater
than 200 kw unless:
a0  All positions in the reactor plenum head are filled with
either a sample assembly (or other unit with the same
coolant flow characteristics) or a fuel element and
there are no less than 19 fuel elements in the core.
b. Each shim control rod is within 4.0 inches of a banked
(average shim rod height) position
co The rotary lid is latched in position.
Bases
The Safety Limits in Section III were derived by assuming
that the D2 0 flow is evenly distributed between fuel elements.
There remains the possibility that the flow is not distributed
evenly through the elements or that the power generation for a
given element or elements varies more than allowed for in the
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calculations. There are two limiting conditions. One occurs
when all the positions in the core contain fuel elements
(30 elements) and the D20 flow Operating Bound is set at 1800
gpm resulting in the minimum flow per element. The other limit
occurs when the number of elements is reduced until the peak
power in the central element exceeds that which was used for the
derivation of the Safety Limit. The calculations were made for
19-element and 30-element cases; hence, the core should not be
operated with less than 19 elements unless the calculations are
again reviewed.
Further, the Safety Limit evaluations included the effect
of banked shim rod height changes but unbalanced shim rod
cornfigurations might lead to higher power per element conditions
then have been calculated; hence, the shim rods should be
effectively banked within about 10%. Since the average differ-
ential reactivity worth of a single shim rod is approximately
1/6 P/inch, a deviation of + 4.0 in, for a single rod will
amount to about 2/3 P, or less than prompt critical. Since
the total core operational excess reactivity is about 10 P, the
effect of a single rod deviation of 4 in0 will be less than 10%
of the total banked shim worth.
The rotary lid acts as a biological shield on the reactor
top. To facilitate the performance of various experiments placed
in the core, the reactor may be operated at power levels below
200 kw with this shield removed. Based on measurements made
under the lid the total dose rate at 200 kw is estimated to be
approximately 2 Rem/hr. This dose rate is not in excess of
those encountered during normal maintenance operations and
adequate controls will be instituted during such experiments to
prevent excessive personnel exposure.
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V. OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
These conditions provide for surveillance to assure
the reliable continuing performance and availability
of vital instruments, equipment, and structures.
90.
V.1. D20 EMERGENCY COOLING FLOW
Applicability
This specification applies to the operation of the
emergency cooling system.
Objective
To assure that the emergency cooling tank is full
and ready to flow D20 onto the fuel plates for a period of
20 minutes in the event of the accidental loss of D2 0 from the
main tank.
Specification
1. The emergency cooling tank will be checked before reactor
startup to power levels of greater than 1 Mw if the reactor
has been shut down for more than 24 hours, to prove that the
"no overflow" alarm is operating properly, that D20 is
flowing into the emergency cooling tank, and that the valving
is properly set and secured to ensure a continued flow at
the proper rate.
2. Spray heads on each new fuel element shall be checked
before insertion.
3. Checks will be made at least once every six months to
insure that the valve setting which is secured will provide
20 minutes of cooling as the D20 is drained from the
emergency cooling tank.
Bases
It is believed that the specifications stipulated
provide adequate assurance that the spray system will be
operable in event it is required. The check of the system
after any prolonged shutdown insures that D20 is flowing into
the emergency cooling tank (and, hence, out through the spray I
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plates) and that the valving has not had its security breached.
The six months check is a recalibration and appears sufficiently
frequent on the basis of ,experience.
No total blockage of any spray head has been observed
in over four years of operation of the spray system.
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V.2. CONTAINWENT TESTING
Applicability
This specification applies to the operation of leak
testing the reactor building containment.
Objective
To ensure the containment integrity of the building
by periodic testing and inspection and to determine and record
building leakage under test conditions.
Specification
1. An integral air leakage test on the reactor building
containment will be conducted biennially with a maximum of
26 months time between tests. The entrance and exit
quick operating valves will be inspected at least once
every six months.
A typical test will be conducted with the conditions of
test pressure greater than 1 psig and less than 2 psig
with blow-off leg set at 2 psig.
2. A test of the proper functioning of the independent
vacuum relief breakers will be conducted annually with a
maximum of 15 months between tests. New penetrations
which may be installed will be checked for strength to
resist the over-pressure and will be leak tested with
soap bubble, freon, or helium methods.
Bases
The containment leakage specification sets limits
on the amount of release of radioactive gas during any
accident that could conceivably escape during an inconceivable
but hypothesized accident. This specification is designed to
give periodic proof that this containment will be always
available.
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The decision to make this a biennial test is based on
practical experience utilizing annual tests in this facility
since 1958.
On only one occasion out of eight has the facility
failed to pass the leak rate tests at two pounds per square
inch. In that one case, the margin by which the facility
failed was very small (2.2% vs. 2%/24 hours) and was caused
by wear and aging of the rubber gaskets on the intake and
exhaust of the quick operating valves. Since each of these two
valves is backed up by a second failsafe type closure, the
facility could still have been maintained at 2 psig within its
leak rate in event of an emergency. The provision to inspect
the quick operating valves visually at six-month intervals
recognizes that these valves are potential weak points.
The original design and specification called for a
building to withstand 2 psig. The building contractor
fabricated a building to withstand 2 psig, but stipulated that
the guarantee was not valid at pressures over 2 psig. The
design and the AEC license call for a building to withstand
2 psig. Therefore, the specification has been written to
permit tests in the pressure range between 1 psig and 2 psig.
Past experience has shown a negligible difference between the
leakage predicted on a straight pressure difference
calculational basis and that observed in the region of the
pressure tests.
The vacuum breakers will be tested under pressure
as an integral part of the containment leakage test. It is
necessary also to test them under vacuum to ensure that they
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will open properly. The building is designed for pressure
differentials of less than -0.10 psig (inside pressure minus
outside pressure). While it is hard to envision a credible
accident in which the containment was breached by an external
over-pressure as a part of the accident, none the less, the
vacuum breakers do provide additional assurance that
external over-pressure cannot be a problem.
Past experience in the installation of additional
penetrations has shown that any of the tests mentioned gives
adequate assurance of leak tightness by utilizing the
normally-available small negative difference in pressure
between inside and outside. At 2 psig leaks of importance
normally can be heard and are easily detected.
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V.3. REACTOR INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE
Applicability
This specification applies to the operation of
instrumentation whose surveillance is important to reactor
safety.
Objective
To ensure the reliability and accuracy of the
instrumentation important to safe operation of the reactor.
Specifidation
1. The following instrument functions will be tested or
checked (and adjusted if required) each time before
startup of the reactor if the reactor has been shut down
more than 24 hours or if they have been repaired or
deenergized:
(a) Neutron level channels (minimum of two) - scram test
(b) D20 flow - scram test
(c) Period channels (minimum of one) - scram test
(d) D20 tank level - scram test -
(e) D20 outlet temperature - scram test
(f) Helium circulation system and D20 recombiner -
operational check
(g) Maximum security condition - major scram test (manual
scram)
(h) Emergency coolant system - operational check
(i) Containment closure - AP interlock check
(j) Stack, plenum, water, particulate, and area
monitors - level set and trip point
(k) Check voltage of emergency batteries.
2. The following instruments will be calibrated when initially
installed, or any time a significant change in indication
is noted, or at least annually:
(a) Neutron level channels
(b) Period channels
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(c) D20 flow instrumentation
(d) D20 temperature detectors.
3. The calibration of the following radiation monitors will
be checked initially and at least quarterly with a standard
source:
(a) Plenum monitor
(b) Stack monitor
(c) Particulate monitor
(d) Water monitor
(e) Area Monitor
Bases
An MITR operating cycle begins with an initial
startup and closes with shutdown procedure. Each time before
startup of the reactor, all scrams and important safety
devices and interlocks are checked in accordance with a
startup checklist. The shutdown checklist turns off all
instruments not needed for shutdown cooling and safety
parameters. Since some instrumentation is deenergized and
other instrumentation may drift over a shutdown of several days
it is deemed prudent to apply the specification above.
The 24-hour limit is established to permit restart
after a shutdown for maintenance without the necessity to
recalibrate all of the instruments. The limit of 24 hours
was chosen on the basis of experience which indicates that the
instrumentation used does not drift significantly or mal-
function during that period if left energized and operating.
In view of the overlapping indications available in every case
and the knowledge which the operators have of the proper
instrument behavior and readings, the 24-hour period is deemed
not to affect significantly adversely the safety of the reactor.
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If an instrument fails during operation and the reactor
must be shut down to repair it and all other instruments are
left in an energized and operating condition, only the affected
instruments need be tested and checked before resuming
operation within 24 hours for the reasons outlined above. If
the repair takes longer than 24 hours, it is felt that the
entire startup checklist must be done for the reasons
outlined above.
All neutron level channels are given a relative
calibration check each time the startup checklist is performed.
The trip point is determined by the previous operating period
chamber output current versus thermal power. This automatically
compensates for component aging. Frequently, a cobalt foil
irradiation is done as a check on process system thermal power
instruments. The cobalt foil is always irradiated in the same
position for the same amount of time, so that a relative neutron
flux measurement is obtained. These operational checks ensure
the reliability of the instruments, so that an annual overall
calibration is sufficient to ensure safe, reliable operation.
This has been verified by experience.
When a new radiation monitor is installed, an overall
calibration is performed. A standard source is then placed
by the detector and the instrument reading is recorded. The
standard source check is repeated at least quarterly. An
overall calibration is only considered necessary when the
source check is not satisfactory.
Once the reactor is in operation, the proper
function of these instruments is quite reliable and deviations
98.
from the normal are easily and quickly noted. The interaction
of the parameters they measure makes it quite easy to double-
check the performance of any one instrument. For instance,
neutron level and period channels can be checked against one
another. Or, to take a more complex case, a drop in D2 O tank
level should give a level alarm and a no overflow alarm, then
a scram, a separate indicator should show the drop, and a
sight glass can be used to check it; and if the D20 continues
to drop without a scram reactivity will be affected and power
will drop (unless control rods are pulled out to compensate),
all neutron levels channels will show the drop, the period
channels will show a negative period, the core outlet
temperature should drop, and even the recombiner temperature
will eventually fall as power drops and there is less
deuterium to recombine.
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V.4. RESPONSE TIME REQUIREMENTS AND SURVEILLANCE
Applicability
This specification applies to the response times
for automatic safety devices and to the operation of measur-
ing those times.
Objective
To ensure that the time response of the reactor
safety devices is rapid enough to assure the safety of the
reactor and its environs under all circumstances.
Specification
1. (a) The control rod trip time from initiation of the
original input signal to the nuclear instrumentation,
including the rod drop time, shall be 1.5 sec.
(b) The time for the D2 0 reflector to dump from the
overflow pipe level to the dump level shall be
20 sec.
(c) The time from initiation of the electronic signal
for the radiation monitor trip in the plenum and
including ventilation damper closing shall be less
than the time for effluent air to flow from the
radiation monitor to the damper.
2. The above requirements shall be checked one or more times
each year. In particular, the period trip rod drop
response time shall be checked utilizing simulated input
periods of one second and 0.1 second.
Bases
The actual measured value for release time of the
magnet is 50 msec and the measured value of the drop time is
430 msec. (Total release and drop time is thus 0.5 sec.)
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The Bases for the Specification presented in 111.4
showed that it might be necessary to assure that at least 2.8%
or more in negative reactivity had been put into the core
1.5 seconds after initiation of the scram signal if the power
oscillations observed in Spert II under flow conditions were
not to be a problem. The 1.5-second requirement assured that
the negative reactivity is added with an adequate safety margin.
Figure E-2 of MITR-5007 shows that 2.8% in negative reactivity
is added to the core by scram in approximately.0.21 seconds
including the magnet release time, and 5% in 0.25 seconds.
The maximum D20 reflector dump time shall be _- 20
seconds. The actual measured value is 11 seconds. If the
reflector takes more than 20 seconds to dump, this would
indicate the dump valve is not functioning properly and should
be repaired.
The radiation monitor trip and damper closure time
at various trip settings and count rates have been measured.
Tests have been carried out in the past to measure the time
required from initiation of a radiation monitor transient
signal to the full closure of the ventilation damper. Tests
have also been carried out to give assurance that the time
for the passage of effluent air from the monitor to the damper
is less than the closure time. The methods used for these
tests are accurate enough to assure MIT that no activity from
a puff burst will escape.
The choice of requiring that these checks be made
annually is based on experience. No major deviations in any
of the times specified in la, b, and c have been found since
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the reactor was first operated in 1958. In particular, it is
difficult to conceive how the most important one, the control
rod drop time could change materially since it is based on
cutting off six electrical magnet currents and the independent
free fall in open water and separately guided passages for
each of the control rods. Therefore, for the rod drop test
it is mostly the magnet release time that is being tested.
This has been found to be quite constant and, therefore,
could be tested at intervals of more than a year.
The D20 reflector dump time (lb) and the damper
closing time (lc) are somewhat more subject to variation as a
function of use and, therefore, the frequency of test of one
year has been based largely on (lb) and (lc).
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V.5 RECOMBINER SURVEILLANCE
Applicability
This specification applies to the operation and
surveillance of the D2 catalytic recombiner system.
Objective
To ensure that recombination of the dissociated D2
and 02 is taking place.
Specification
1. Before increasing reactor power above 200 kw the following
recombiner parameters shall be adjusted and checked:
(a) The temperature in the middle of the recombiner >500C.
(b) Recombiner flow rate >1.5 cfm and < 8 cfm.
2. If either of these parameters falls outside the above
limits and cannot be restored within a two hour period,
D2 analysis shall be started or the reactor power will be
reduced to (200 kw.
3. As a part of normal operation at power the operator will
assure himself at least once every two hours that the
recombiner is functioning correctly.
Bases
Operating experience has shown that the recombiner
operates most efficiently when operated in the range indica-
ted in the above Specification. A rise in temperature in the
recombiner is a result of the recombination process and is
positive indication that the recombiner is performing its
function. An efficiency study of the recombiner was done in
a thesis by John Nils Hanson. For the results of Hanson's
thesis, see the Bases of 111.6 D2 Concentration Limit.
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VI. DESIGN FEATURES
.04.
VI o1 FUEL ELEMENT DESIGN LIMITATIONS
Applicability
This specification applies to design standards for
fuel elements.
Objective
To ensure that the design of any fuel elements used
in the reactor will provide adequate containment for the
fission fragments, adequate and rapid heat transfer from the
fuel through the clad to the water and adequate cooling of the
element, and adequate.boiling shutdown in event of a severe
reactivity accident.
Specification
l The fuel-bearing sections of the core shall consist of
thin tubes or plates, each of which has a fuel section
composed of uranium or UO2 and aluminum clad by a layer of
aluminum metal of not more than 0.025 in0 thickness or
less than 0,015 in.
2. The design of any element shall be such that in normal
operation no bulk boiling shall occur in this or any
other element in the core due to neutron flux peaking
or D20 flow distribution when the element is placed in
any position in the core0 This fact shall be ascertained
by appropriate tests0
3. (a) Element designs shall be tested by prototype tests
of dummy elements to see that they do not deform,
disassemble or give indications of undue vibration
at a flow rate of at least 12 fte per secondo
(b) The element shall be mechanically locked in position
in the reactor core during periods when the reactor
is critical
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4. Any element design ishall provide a minimum core averaged
negative void coefficient of 170 mp/liter of void in the
active section of the element.
5. The design of any element shall be such that in a 19-
element core operated normally (i.e., 19 elements or more
and with shim rods banked) the calculated maximum fuel
element plate temperature shall not exceed 450 0C in event
that any of the Safety Limits is reached.
6. All elements shall be so designed that, in a core
containing 19 to 30 elements, they will operate in a stable
flow regime within the limits set by the Technical
Specifications on reactor power and outlet temperature.
Bases
Ref. (8) ("Process System Requirements of the MIT
Reactor at Five Megawatts," W. R. Devoto) provides the basic
equations and methods, and outlines the experiments upon which
the design will be based.
The minimum clad thickness is based upon a series
of MTR tests on elements with similar clad. These tests show
that clad thicknesses of 5 or 10 mils permitted some fission
products to be emitted. They also showed that 15-mil clad
was completely adequate from the normal operating fission
product retention viewpoint. Ref. (26), p. 672, shows that
a thick clad increases the delay time for heat removal in
event of a fast transient. Therefore, the clad should be as
thin as possible while still remaining compatible with fission
product retention requirements.
The selection of a no bulk boiling criterion assures
that there will be no major fluctuations in reactor power due
to the evolution and collapse of voids in the fuel and its
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feedback effects on reactivity. Also, as shown in III.1,
111.2, and 111.3, it has the effect of establishing a
maximum heat flux per plate. This corresponds according to
Ref. (7), as modified by the considerations of III.1, to the
equation:
-3 '0.8
PPMAX = 7.82 x 10 ( 8) T . (III.1-4a)
Any fuel element should be designed for structural
integrity and stability including possible vibrational effects.
The design should assure that they will remain rigidly in
place. Thus one specification requires that new types of
elements be hydraulically tested at conditions more severe
than normally encountered. The maximum flow velocity expected
during 5 Mw operation is approximately 8 ft./sec.
As indicated in 111.4, the principal shutdown
mechanism which would terminate a severe nuclear transient is
boiling. Thus the quantity of reactivity worth which can be
obtained to shut down the reactor in such an event is an
important part of the core trans:Lent behavior. Thus a
specification of the void coeffic.ient and total available
void volume in each element is important. The choice of
this particular specification insures that future fuel
elements will comply with the Safety Limit set forth in III.4.
The ultimate safety goal of fuel element design
remains to ensure that the 450 0. plate surface temperature
is not exceeded. This value was chosen as indicated in the
Introduction because aluminum melts at about 6600C and its
strength deteriorates significantly with temperatures above
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4500C. Harwell reports that they have observed severe
blistering of irradiated fuel under prolonged exposures to
temperatures of 550 0 with the onset of the phenomenon at
about 5000C (C2).
The design of any fuel element must also ensure
that no flow instabilities or burnout can occur in thermal-
hydraulic regimes which could conceivably be reached in
normal or abnormal operation. Therefore, a specification
has been set up so as to make the design and characteristics
of any new fuel elements be self-consistent with those now
in use.
The specifications set forth above make the thermal,
hydraulic, and nuclear characteristics of any allowable fuel
element design consistent with the Safety Limits described
in these Specifications. Therefore, the utilization of any
fuel element complying with these Specifications does not
constitute an unreviewed safety problem.
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VIl. ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
1. Organization
(a) The MITR shall be administratively controlled by the
Administration of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The chain of administrative authority
and responsibility includes successively the President
of the Institute, the Dean of the School of
Engineering, the Chairman of the Department of Nuclear
Engineering, and the Reactor Director.
(b) The Reactor Director, a member of the Department of
Nuclear Engineering, shall be responsible for overall
direction and operation of the reactor facility and
control of the reactor fuel.
(c) The Reactor Operations Superintendent shall be
responsible to the Director for the operation,
maintenance, and refueling of the reactor and for
it associated facilities.
(d) The MIT Assistant Medical Director in charge of the
Occupational Medical Service shall be responsible
for radiation protection at the MITR and its
facilities. The MIT Assistant Medical Director
reports through the Medical Director to the
President's Office. He shall provide for review
and approval of all types of experiments and shall
provide for monitoring of operations and conduct of
experiments with respect to radiological safety.
(e) There shall be a local Reactor Safeguards Committee
which shall be responsible to the Administration of
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MIT. The Committee shall review and approve from the
safety viewpoint: (1) the principles and administra-
tion of operating and radiation protection procedures,
(2) proposed modifications. to the. reactor affecting
its safety, and (3) general types of experiments and
special specific experiments for each of the
experimental facilities of the reactor and proposed
modifications to such experiments. The Committee shall
conduct or have conducted periodic audits of operations,
equipment performance, logs, and procedures.
(f) The reactor program for medical applications shall be
reviewed by the MIT Reactor Biomedical Advisory Commit-
tee. This Committee shall be responsible to the Admin-
istration of MIT and shall review and approve the bio-
medical experiments.
(g) General types of experiments and special specific
experiments for each of the experimental facilities of
the reactor as approved by the Safeguards Committee or
by the Reactor Biomedical Advisory Committee shall
also be reviewed and approved prior to installation in
the reactor by the Reactor Director and the MIT
Assistant Medical Director if not members of the
approving Committee.
(h) Each experiment shall be reviewed and approved by a
supervisor of the reactor operations staff and by a
responsible member of the radiological safety staff
prior to insertion into the reactor.
(i) During the intervals between periodic audits noted in
l(e) the Reactor Director shall provide for
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continuing review of operations, procedures, and
equipment performance.
(j) The results of reviews, approvals or recommendations,
and the bases for such approvals or recommendations
by each of the groups mentioned in paragraphs (d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) shall be documented and
kept as a part of the MIT Reactor records.
(k) Regularly assigned members of the organization
described above, if unavailable for normal functions,
may be temporarily replaced by qualified substitutes
by written authorization of the regularly assigned
member or his superior.
2. Procedures for Operation
(a) Detailed written procedures and check sheets (i.e.,
manipulation instructions) for operation of the
reactor and its supporting facilities, maintenance
operations, and emergency operations and radiation
protection shall be provided and shall be in
conformance with these Technical Specifications.
(b) All initial detailed written procedures and check
sheets shall be prepared by the reactor operations
staff and shall be reviewed and approved in writing
by the Reactor Operations Superintendent and the
Reactor Director before being put into effect.
This review shall be made in such a way as to ensure
conformity with these Technical Specifications and
the principles and administration of operating and
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radiation protection procedures as set down by the MIT
Reactor Safeguards Committee. Subsequent changes or
modifications to the initial detailed written
procedures which do not alter the intent of the
initial procedures shall be approved by the Reactor
Operations Superintendent.
(c) Written procedures shall include, but not be limited
to, the following:
Hydraulic and nuclear startup or shutdown of the
reactor,
Fuel element charging to and discharging from
the reactor,
Replacement of the control rods,
Installation and operation of experiments,
Performance of normal major maintenance on system
components, and
Action to be taken in event of abnormal
conditions of the reactor plant.
3. Reactor Operation
Members of the operating staff shall each be
familiar with each procedure for which he has responsibility.
A complete and current set of procedures, for both normal
and abnormal conditions, shall be maintained in the reactor
control room. A personal set of radiation protection
procedures shall be issued to each person working in the
MITR facility. Upon occurrence of abnormal conditions
in controls, safety systems, auxiliary systems, or
experiments, or if a Limiting Safety System Setting or
Limiting Operating Value is exceeded, action shall be
113.
taken immediately to ensure the safety of the facility and
determine the cause of the abnormal behavior.
The staff shall conduct drills at sufficient
frequency to insure proficiency in emergency procedures.
Logs and Records
Logs of operation and maintenance shall be
maintained.
(a) The operations log shall have recorded:
(1) routinely pertinent data regarding system
operation,
(2) actions of operators and experimenters, and
(3) details of any abnormalities occurring and
actions taken thereon
(b) The maintenance log shall have recorded:
(1) routine maintenance component replacement
and calibration,
(2) equipment failures, and
(3) replacement of major items of equipment.
5. Changes
Changes to facility equipment (other than
replacement of components or parts) shall be reviewed
and approved by the Reactor Director and at least one
other qualified person as he may designate. Results of
such reviews, with bases therefore shall be documented
and maintained as part of the MIT Reactor records.
6. Operating Limitations
(a) Whenever fuel is being positioned in the reactor
grid plate or any operation is being performed that
4.
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could result in the release of radioactivity or create
a change in radiation levels or affect reactivity, the
reactor and its supporting facilities shall be
maintained on an operational basis as described in
these Technical Specifications.
(b) Whenever the reactor is critical, or its control rods
can be raised or are being manipulated, there shall be
a minimum crew of two men, one of whom shall be in
charge and shall bear responsibility for the safe
operation of the facility. He shall have a valid
Senior Operator's license.
(c) Whenever the reactor is critical or undergoing an
operation which may change its reactivity, the control
room shall be attended by a licensed operator and the
reactor instrumentation shall be in operation and
monitored by the operator. Manipulation of any
components, mechanisms, or apparatus conducted outside
the control room which may affect safety of any
reactor system or experiment shall be conducted with
the knowledge of the reactor operator.
7. Actions to be Taken in Event Technical Specification Limits
Have Been Exceeded or Stated Conditions Are Not Met
(a) If any of the Safety Limits of Technical Specifications
III.l through III.6 are exceeded, the reactor
immediately shall be placed in a condition of maximum
security, and the situation shall be reported to the
Division of Compliance, Region I. Reactor operation
shall not be resumed until regulatory approval has
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been received.
(b) In the event any condition as stated in Technical
Specifications IV.1 through VI.1 is not met,
(1) if the reactor is in operation when the condition
is discovered, either execution of approved
emergency procedures for temporary continuance'
of operation or reduction in power or shutdown,
as appropriate, shall be accomplished until the
condition is rectified, or
(2) if the condition is discovered while the reactor
is shut down, operation shall not be resumed
until the condition has been rectified.
(c) If any Limiting Safety System setting, Limiting
Operating Value, or Limiting Condition of Operation
is exceeded, the condition shall be reviewed by the
Reactor Director and such other persons as he may
designate. The review and basis for actions taken
as a result thereof shall be documented and main-
tained as part of the MIT Reactor records.
(d) The responsibility for adherence to limits and
conditions set forth in this license shall rest with
the MIT Administration. Any instance of failure to
observe administrative requirements set forth herein
shall be reviewed by the MIT Administration and the
result of such review and actions taken, with bases
therefore shall be documented and maintained as part
of the MIT records.
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